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1. Executive summary 
A Computer Generated Forces (CGF) system must both generate behavior and perform 
physical modeling for the entities it is controlling. The process of determinin.g when entities 
"see" one another is an essential component of modeling behavior and combines both 
behavior and physical modeling. Many factors (behavioral and physical) are involved in one 
entity "seeing" another; e.g. attention, angle of view, weather, obscurants, time of day, and 
sensor system. These factors are modeled in each CGF system's "sighting model" which may 
differ among CGF systems. However, all sighting models are based on the existence or non-
existence of a unblocked straight line between the entities, the "line of sight". This line of 
sight represents the path of light between entities. Every "sighting determination" rests on 
an "intervisibility determination" which determines whether the line of sight between two 
entities is blocked by the surface of the terrain, terrain features, or intervening entities. 
In order to generate behavior that is responsive to changes in battlefield situations, a CGF 
system must perform intervisibility determinations between each entity it is controlling and 
each hostile entity in the simulation at frequent intervals, typically once per second. Thus, in 
a scenario of even moderate size a great many intervisibility determinations must be made. 
Moreover, each entity-to-entity intervisibility determination can require considerable 
computational expense as the line segment that represents the line of sight is tested for 
intersection with the terrain, feature, and entity polygons that lie along it. It is very possible 
for a CGF system to spend as much as 50% of its computational power performing this one 
operation. 
In earlier work, researchers at the Institute for Simulation and Training (1ST) developed 
three new algorithms for the intervisibility determination process. The best of those 
algorithms was 25% faster than the best previously available. Unfortunately, the new 
algorithms required specific terrain database formats to operate, a fact that limited their 
applicability to the 1ST CGF Testbed. 
In the research described in this report, 1ST has taken a different approach. Rather than 
trying to speed each indiuidual interuisibility determination, the goal of this work was to 
reduce the number of interuisibility determinations done by a CGF system. This was 
accomplished through a set of intervisibility heuristics. A heuristic is a "rule of thumb" or a 
"guess" that is right most of the time. Intervisibility heuristics are algorithmic "rules of 
thumb" that determine when an intervisibility determination can be skipped or delayed by 
the CGF system. Note that this approach is independent of terrain database format. 
Of course, simply reducing the number of intervisibility determinations is of questionable 
value if the realism of the CGF behavior is degraded by the heuristic. The intervisibility 
heuristics described in this report were designed to delay the first sighting of a hostile entity 
by as little time as possible and thereby have minimal impact on the CGF behavior. 
Seven intervisibility heuristics were designed. The heuristics , and their basic ideas, are: 
1. Symmetry; the result of a determination from entity A to entity B will also apply 
from B to A until one of them moves . 
2. History; if two entities have (or have not) had a line of sight for some time, they are 
likely to continue to have (or not have) a line of sight in the immediate future. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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3. Sighter; certain characteristics of the sighter, such as its firepower status or 
proximity to hostile entities, make it more or less likely to need intervisibility 
determinations from it. 
4. Target; certain characteristics of the target, such as its damage status or movement 
direction relative to hostile entities make it more or less likely to need intervisibility 
determinations to it. 
The History, Sighter, and Target heuristics were also implemented in fine-grain versions 
which are based on the same ideas but use a finer time granularity when delaying 
intervisibility determinations. 
All seven of these heuristics were implemented within the 1ST CGF Testbed. To evaluate 
their performance, they were tested individually in three scenarios of different military types 
(Meeting Engagement, Delay, and Assault). Data was gathered for each heu:ristic as to how 
many intervisibility determinations it saved and by how much it delayed the sighting of each 
hostile entity. 
All of the heuristics performed well at reducing intervisibility determinations with the 
savings ranging from 10% to 50%. Even taking the overhead of computing the heuristic into 
account, significant reductions in computational load associated with intervisibility 
processing were achieved_ 
These computational savings had negligible negative effect on the behavior of the CGF 
entities. The heuristics caused an average delay in sightings by the CGF entit.ies of 0.3 to 0.5 
seconds, i.e. ofless than one second. 
These results can be of great importance to CGF systems. By using one of these heuristics, 
the computational load of intervisibility determination can be greatly reduced, thereby 
freeing computational capacity that can be applied to generating more sophisticated 
behavior, performing more realistic physical modeling, or simply controlling more entities on 
a given system. Because these heuristics are completely independent of the tE,rrain database 
format, they can be applied to any CGF system. 
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2. Introductjon 
2.1. Purpose 
This technical report is a deliverable under STRICOM contract N61339-92-C-0045, 
"Intelligent Autonomous Behavior by Semi·Automated Forces in Distributed Interactive 
Simulation". It comprises both CDRL A004 "Line of Sight Technical Report", which is the 
main body of the report, and CDRL A003 "Line of Sight Test Data", which is Appendix A.7. 
Its purpose is to report the methodology and results of experimental software development 
conducted at the Institute for Simulation and Training (1ST) under that contract. The goal of 
the software development was to produce heuristics that would reduce the overall 
computational expense of intervisibility determination in Computer Generated Forces (CGF) 
systems without affecting the realism of the autonomous behavior produced by those 
systems. 
2.2. Structure of this document 
The remainder of this section contains background information on Distributed Interactive 
Simulation, Computer Generated Forces, the 1ST CGF Testbed, and 1ST's research results in 
the CGF area. Readers familiar with these topics may safely skip those subsections without 
loss of continuity. 
Sections 3 and 4 introduce concepts of intervisibility in Distributed Interactive Simulation 
(DIS) and CGF systems and explain how intervisibility is calculated in the 1ST CGF Testbed. 
Section 5 describes the intervisibility heuristics developed by 1ST and how they were 
implemented. Section 6 presents the experimental evaluation of the implem.mted heuristics 
and the results of that evaluation. Section 7 states the conclusions drawn from those results. 
Section 8 lists the references cited in the report. Finally, the Appendices sedion contains a 
va riety of supplemental information about the heuristics and the experiment that may be of 
interest to some readers. 
2.3. Background 
2.3.1. Distributed Interactive Simulation 
Distributed Interactive Simulation is an architecture for building large-seale simulation 
models from a set of independent simulator nodes (DIS [1993]). The simulator nodes are 
linked by a network and communicate via a common network protocol. (The term DIS is also 
sometimes used to designate a particular network protocol standard; in this document "DIS" 
refers to the simulation architecture; the DIS protocol standard will be so identified.) In DIS, 
the simulator nodes each independently simulates the activities of one or more entities in the 
simulated system and report their attributes and actions of interest to other simulator nodes 
via the network. The simulated entities coexist in a common environment (for example, a 
terrain database) and interact by exchanging network packets (Loper et. al. [19911). Finally, 
an important characteristic of DIS simulations is that they are real-time; events in the 
simulation occur at the same rate as their real-world counterparts. 
The DARPAIUS Army SIMNET system is a DIS-type system. SIMNET is used to train tank 
and vehicle crews in cooperative and team tactics. Thorpe[1987J and Popel 1989J are good 
examples of the extensive SIMNET literature. In SIMNET, the simulator nodes, or 
3 
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simulators, typically represent single vehicles, such as tanks or infantry fighting vehicles. 
SIMNET simulators are complex devices consisting of a simulation comput er, a computer 
image generator, and a physical re-creation of the vehicle interior; they are manned by three 
or four human trainees. During the execution of a scenario, each simulator's simulation 
computer continuously tracks the position of the vehicle on a terrain database common to all 
vehicles in the scenario. The trainees maneuver their vehicle over the terrain and interact 
with (for example, fire their weapons at) other vehicles. The simulators are linked by an 
Ethernet network, which carries the packets needed to mediate inter-vehicle interaction. 
By exchanging these packets, actions taken by one simulator are made known to other 
simulators in real-time. Each vehicle broadcasts appearance packets, which are used by 
other vehicles to generate visual images, and fire and impact packets , which are used to 
signal and adjudicate weapons firing. 
A DIS system, of which SIMNET is the archetype, depends on two points of commonality 
among the networked simulators. The first point is the shared ·playing fi eld", or simulated 
environment. In order that events and actions could be consistent among s imulators, the 
simulated environments must be either identica l or isomorphic. For example, if two tank 
simulators share terrain databases which are identical except that a bridge present in the 
first is omitted in the second, when the first tank traverses the bridge it will appear to the 
second to be floating on air or water. 
The second required point of commonality is the network protocol. A DIS protocol specifies 
the various types and formats of network packets which the simulator nodes will exchange to 
support the simulation model. Additionally, the protocol defines the precis" circumstances 
under which each packet type should be sent by a simulator node, and the interpretation that 
should be performed when each packet type is received. 
2.3.2. Computer Generated Forces 
In the case of SIMNET and its currently envisioned DIS successors, the system is designed to 
provide a simulat ed battlefield which is used for training milita ry personnel. In such a 
battlefield, the trainees need an opposing force against which to train . There are at least 
three ways to provide the simulated opponent. 
In the first method, two groups of trainees in simulators may oppose each other. For 
example, it is possible to configure SIMNET simulators during startup so that the computer 
image generators in each force's simulators display their own force's vehicles as US vehicles 
(Ml Abrams and M2 Bradleys) and the opposing force's vehicles as enemy vehicles (T-72s 
and BMPs). Thus both sides see themselves as US forces and their opponents as the enemy. 
This method is often used, and the soldiers enjoy the competitive aspects of the arrangement, 
but it has several disadvantages. It increases the number of expensive simulators needed at 
a training site and requires that to train any given military unit a second unit be available to 
provide the opposition. Finally, the trainees are faced with opponents who, despite the 
appearance of their vehicles in the video screens, use U.S. Army tactical doctrine because 
U.S. Army soldiers are controlling the vehicles . It would be preferable to provide the trainees 
with opponents who use the tactical doctrine of the actual or anticipated enemy. 
A second method is to use human instructors who are trained to behave in a way that mimics 
the desired enemy doctrine. Doing so does not reduce the need for simulators and is 
expensive in manpower costs because large numbers of trained instructors may be required. 
Furthermore, the instructors must be retrained for each new enemy's doctrin.,. This method 
is seldom used. 
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The third technique is to use a computer system that generates and controls multiple 
simulation entities using software and possibly a human operator. This type of system is 
known as a semi-automated force (SAF or SAFOR) or a computer generated force (CGF). The 
following sections will describe, in general terms, the features and structure of CGF systems. 
2.3.2.1. Characteristics of CGF systems 
Certain characteristics are common to all existing CGF systems. Some of the most important 
of those characteristics are listed below and each will be described in turn. 
1. Network connection and protocol 
2. Battlefield environment simulation 
3. Support for multiple entities 
4. Autonomous behavior generation 
5. Operator control of behavior 
6. Representation of the military organizational hierarchy 
2.3.2.1.1. Network connection and protocol 
Because DIS-type simulations are networked, a CGF system needs both a physical 
connection to the network and the appropriate software to send and receive network packets. 
Furthermore, the system must conform to the network protocol that has been defined for the 
simulation. A CGF system is required to send valid network packets when specified by the 
protocol; such actions may be time or event triggered. Finally, the arrival of incoming 
network packets sent by other simulation entities should be handled correctly, as per the 
protocol. For example, if a CGF system receives a packet tha t signifies that one of its 
controlled entities has been hit by an anti-tank missile, it should assess the da mage that may 
result from that impact. 
2.3.2.1.2. Battlefield environment simulation 
The entities controlled by the CGF system exist in a battlefield which is a sim lated subset of 
the real world. As such, the CGF controlled entities should obey the laws of p ysics relevant 
to the activi ties occurring in the battlefield. Often this means that one must use physical 
laws to model such behavior Barr[19891. although lower-cost solutions may sometimes be 
appropriate (i.e. physical modeling vs. simplified kinematics). Using physics, the vehicle 
dynamics of the CGF entities can be modeled, including acceleration, deceleration, turn 
rates, and vehicle performance characteristics. (For an example of CGF aircraft vehicle 
dynamics modeling, see Cimini et. al.[1992].) 
The CGF system usually includes a terrain database over which the battle will be fou ght; it 
may be a detailed polygonal representation of an actual piece of terrain, or a la rge featureless 
plane corresponding to the surface of the ocean. The effects of the terrain on the simulation 
even ts should be modeled, including terrain effects on movement and line of sight 
obscuration. 
Because the world being simulated is a battlefield, combat interactions need to be modeled in 
accordance with the physics of weapon and armor performance characteristics. For example, 
in both DIS and SIMNET, a CGF tank that fires on a hostile vehicle determines if a hit was 
achieved using a set of factors that include range, exposure of the ta rget, and perform ance of 
the tank's weapon and sighting systems. If a hit is inflicted , the impacted ve icle considers 
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munition type, range, impact angle, and armor protection to assess the damage it suffers. 
The accuracy of these calculations is of central importance to the validity of the simulation. 
2.3.2.1.3. Support for multiple entities 
CGF systems typically provide simultaneous support for multiple entities. Their usefulness 
is due in large part to this characteristic. The CGF system's architecture must provide a 
means to allocate processing resources to all of its supported entities. 
2.3.2.1.4. Autonomous behavior generation 
A CGF system will use built-in behavior to react autonomously to the simulation situation or 
to carry out orders given by its operator. Its behavior may be encoded as algorithms, 
production rules, formal behavior specifications, or some other form. The intent is for the 
CGF system's behavior to be autonomous (i.e . not requiring human contro\) and realistic (i.e. 
true to doctrine, physics, and human responses) to the greatest possible extent. 
Most current CGF research is focused in the area of autonomous behavior generation. 1ST 
and other research labs are attempting to increase the level of autonomy of CGF systems. 
2.3.2.1.5. Operator control of behavior 
In addition to the autonomous behavior, a CGF system should include an operator interface 
that allows a human operator to control the CGF entities. The operator may override 
autonomously generated behavior, or he or she may initiate and control behavior in 
situations that are beyond the CGF system's capabilities. Existing CGF systems typically 
provide a map display of the battlefield that shows the battlefield terrain and the simulated 
entities on it, together with a human command interface. 
2.3.2.1.6. Representation of the military organizational hierarchy 
Military units have hierarchical organizations. As CGF systems are designed to control 
larger numbers of entities, it becomes increasingly important to represent the military 
hierarchy of those entities in the system. With the representation of the hierarchy in place, 
the operator can give orders to higher level units, or the CGF system can autonomously 
generate behavior for a unit. Then, the unit level order could be automatically interpreted 
and passed down to the constituent entities for execution. 
2.3.3. The 1ST CGF Testbed 
Under the sponsorship of ARPA and STRICOM, 1ST has been conducting research in the 
area of CGF systems, seeking to increase the realism and autonomy of CGF behavior. A key 
product of that sponsorship is the 1ST CGF Testbed. The 1ST CGF Testbed is a CGF system 
tha t provides an environment for testing CGF behavioral control algorithms . It is 
documented in Danisas et. al.[19901, Gonzalez et. al.[19901, Petty[1992cl, Smith et. 
al.[1992al, and Smith et. al.[1992b]. 
A minimaliST CGF Testbed configuration consists of two standard IBM-compatible personal 
computers (PCs), each running one of the two software components of the CGF Testbed; the 
"Simulator" and the "Operator Interface" (or 01). The Simulator performs the computations 
for vehicle dynamics, battlefield environment simulation, and behavior generation for the 
computer controlled CGF entities. The 01 provides an operator interface to the CGF system 
consisting of a plan view display battlefield map and a menu-based mouse and keyboard 
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input system. The CGF operator enters commands for the CGF entities usin.g the 01, which 
passes those commands to the Simulator for execution by the CGF entities. The 01 and the 
Simulator communicate via the simulation network. 
One of the goals of this research on CGF systems was to demonstrate the feasibility of low-
cost CGF systems. Consequently, the 1ST CGF Testbed was developed and runs on IBM-
compatible personal computers . The basic configuration can support approximately 12 CGF 
entities, which is roughly the number of vehicles in a military unit of company size. 
The simulation network is used for communication between the Simulator and the 01 was to 
permit easy scaling ofthe Testbed. If more than 12 entities or more than one 01 is required, 
additional PCs may be attached to the network. The Simulator and 01 software both adjust 
automatically to the presence of more than one of either component. 
The Testbed software is written in ANSI C, and is compiled with the Borland C++ compiler . 
The 1ST CGF Testbed can be compiled so as to communicate on the simulation network using 
either of two network protocol standards: DIS 2.0.3 or SIMNET 6.6.1. 
Like other CGF systems, the 1ST CGF Testbed depends on the operator to perform high level 
planning and mission control. However, the 1ST CGF Testbed contains a range of flexibl e 
intermediate level behaviors that operate automatically and realistically. 
One example of such intermediate level behavior is the Testbed's Fire_Weapons behavior for 
infantry fighting vehicles (lFVs). IFVs, such as the M2 Bradley or the RusBian built BMP, 
typically have a variety of weapons systems, each suited to a particular type of target and 
tactical situation. M2 Bradleys are armed with a coaxial machine gun, used against infantry 
at short range; a 25mm cannon, used against infantry at longer range and vehicles other 
than tanks at short and medium range; and TOW anti-tank missiles, used against vehicles 
other than tanks at long range and tanks at all ranges. The IFV Fire_Weapons behavior 
performs the following actions without operator intervention: 
1. Scan the terrain for visible enemy targets . 
2. Select the most threatening enemy target from among those visible, based on threat 
analysis rules encoded in the behavior. 
3. If more than one enemy target falls into the same threat category, select one from 
among those available based on a fire distribution scheme that considers nearby 
friendly entities. 
4. Select the appropriate weapon for that target. 
5. Prepare the weapon for firing (aim the turret and possibly raise the TOW launcher). 
6. Fire the weapon and determine if a hit was scored. 
7. Reload the weapon. 
For low level behavior, the CGF Testbed includes several fast and effective algorithms. For 
example, the route planner will find routes around terrain obstacles. 
The primary means of behavior specification of the 1ST CGF Testbed is a code structuring 
technique based on finite state machines (FSMs). Behavior in the Testbed is encoded as 
algorithms, written in C. However, that C code is given structure using the FSM mechanism. 
The basic idea is that atomic units of behavior, implemented as C functions, become states in 
a FSM. Each state determines the next state to be entered by testing simulation conditions; 
thus transitions may be triggered by simulation events. More complex behavior can be 
constructed, bottom up, by combining simpler FSMs. FSMs exist as actual structures in the 
CGF Testbed, with each state containing a pointer to the function corresponding to the state . 
The FSM mechanism is described in detail in Smith et. al.[1992a] and Smith et. a1.[1992bJ. 
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3. Interyisjbility concepts 
What does intervisibility mean in a simulation environment? What effect does the rate at 
which we perform intervisibility updates have on the simulated entities and the simulation 
in general? These are some of the questions that this report attempts to answer. This 
section describes some of the basic concepts for intervisibility. 
3.1. Definitions 
Before the question "Does an entity see another entity?" is answered within a CGF system, 
the question "Is it possible for the entity to see the other entity?" must be answered? 
Typically, CGF systems' "sighting models" determine if entities "see" one another and 
incorporate the effects of attention, angle of view, weather, obscurants, time of day, and the 
details of sensor systems. However, sighting models are active only after "intervisibility" 
between two entities has been established. An intervisibility determination establishes or 
denies the existence of an unblocked Line of Sight (LOS) between two entities. 
Establishing intervisibility between two entities involves checking to see whether terrain 
features (such as hills) or other objects (such as other vehicles) prevent a ray of light from 
traveling from one entity to the other. If the ray of light travels unhind!!red (by terrain 
features or other objects) the two entities are said to have "unblocked" intervisibility else the 
intervisibility is said to be "blocked." For the remainder of this discussion, the term "see" 
refers only to an unblocked LOS and does not imply that a sighting model has determined 
that an entity has sighted another. 
It is worth noting that intervisibility, as used in this discussion, is symmetri.:; if A can see B 
then B can also see A (the direction an entity is facing is not considered). Although 
intervisibility is also reflexive (A can see A) intervisibility is not an equivalence relation 
because it is not transitive (A can see Band B can see C does not mean A can see C) . 
The phrase "intervisibility update" is used when an entity is invoked to determine which of 
its opponents it can see. If A performs an intervisibility update and there arE: n opponents in 
the scenario, A will do n individual (i.e., A-to-B) intervisibility determinations. The 
intervisibility update for an entity is initiated by the entity periodically receiving an 
"intervisibility update message." The periodicity of these messages is determined by the 
"intervisibility update rate" (IUR). 
Whenever the intervisibility status changes (from blocked to unblocked or vice-versa) an 
intervisibility "transition" is said to occur. For example, a vehicle may appear from behind a 
hill becoming visible to another, thus causing the intervisibility status between them to 
transition from blocked to unblocked. 
3.2. Computational methods and cost 
Three algorithms to efficiently conduct an intervisibility determination between two entities 
were previously developed and evaluated at 1ST (Petty et. al.[1992a)): 
l. Algorithm F: Grid/edge method 
2. Algorithm C: DCEL Traversal method and 
3. Algorithm P: Triangle Traversal method . 
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Algorithm F is in use in the 1ST CGF research Testbed; a brief description of the 
intervisibility determination algorithm and its time complexity is given in Section 4.1. 
Since extensive terrain checks are required to determine intervisibility status (blocked or 
unblocked) and the checks themselves are complicated, it comes as no surprise that the 
intervisibility computation taxes a system's resources. Very high intervisibility rates (more 
intervisibility updates per second) have shown to load a CGF system so much that the 
generated vehicle behavior degrades. For example, vehicle behavior may degrade such that 
routes are not followed as planned, possibly leading to vehicles circling. Thus, it is important 
that the time spent in performing intervisibility determinations be reduced without 
sacrificing the tactical behavior of vehicles. New algorithms may be invented to make the 
intervisibility determination process take less time or new heuristics may be employed to 
reduce the number of intervisibility determinations; the latter procedure should have 
minimal, or no , effect on the behavior of the system. 
The time consumed by the intervisibility procedure is not the sole cost of doing intervisibility 
determinations. Internal system messages to initiate intervisibility updates require handling 
and delivery. If intervisibility update rates are increased, the delivery costs may become 
significant. 
3.3. Statement of the problem 
As already discussed, intervisibility determinations can use a lot of system time which makes 
attempts to reduce intervisibility determinations worthwhile. Inventing new algorithms for 
intervisibility determination can be very difficult. Highly optimized intervisibility 
determination algorithms rely on the format of the underlying terrain database and may 
become useless if the underlying structure of the terrain database needs to be changed. For 
example, switching from a polygonal to a spline-based terrain representation would render 
polygonal-based intervisibility algorithms useless. 
The goal of the research described in this report is to reduce the total computational load of 
intervisibility determinations on a CGF system. The reduction is to be achieved in a manner 
that has a minimum impact on the realism of the CGF entities' behaviors generated by the 
system. 
1ST's previous intervisibility research focused on efficient intervisibility determination 
within a polygonal terrain database. For the current work, an attempt was made to reduce 
the number of intervisibility determinations made by a CGF system. The approach taken 
was to design, implement, and evaluate heuristics which would decide which intervisibility 
determinations could be skipped or delayed without affecting the CGF entities' behavior. An 
important characteristic of this heuristic approach is that it is independent of terrain 
database format. As a result, the heuristics described and evaluated herein can be used in 
any CGF system. 
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4. IntervisjbiIitv jn the 1ST CGF Testbed 
This section discusses the way intervisibility is done in the 1ST CGF Testbed and the data 
structures used to track entity intervisibility status, i.e., who has intervisibility to whom. 
Section 4.1 gives a brief description of the algorithm in use in the 1ST CGF Testbed . 
Section 4.2 discusses the sightings list and the intervisibility update duration (IUD). 
Section 4.3 discusses the modifications made to the system to implement the heuristics and 
collect data to evaluate them. 
4.1. IntervisibiIity determination algorithm 
Algorithm F (Petty et. al.[1992a)), the Grid edge traversal method algorithm, is used in the 
1ST CGF Testbed for computing intervisibility between entities. The CGF Testbed's internal 
terrain database format, which is based on the SIMNET format, is a polygonal database. The 
surface of the terrain is represented in the database by contiguous non-overlapped polygons; 
the 3D vertices of each polygon are used to compute the height of any point within the 
polygon. The terrain database is divided into 500 meter x 500 meter squares called patches. 
Each patch is composed of sixteen 125 meter x 125 meter squares called grids. 
This sub-division of the terrain database into patches and grids ensures that an algorithm 
can access and traverse the terrain with ease. Both patches and grids can be referenced in 
the data structure by computing indices based on the coordinates of a point inside them. 
Polygons are organized by their patch and grid locations. Each edge within a patch structure 
has a code which tells which grids within the patch contains that edge. Polygons do not span 
patch boundaries. Further , polygons are defined such that patch boundaries coincide with 
polygon edges, although the reverse is not true (polygon edges do not have to coincide with a 
patch boundary). 
The first step in the determination of intervisibility is point location , i.e., locating the patch 
and grid in the terrain database containing the sighter and target locations; the time for this 
operation is a constant independent of the location of the points. 
After point location is done, the patches and grids through which the Line Of Sight (LOS) 
from the sighter to the target passes are determined; these patches and grids must be 
searched for possible intervisibility blockages by base, treeline, or canopy polygons. Patches 
and grids are determined by a traversal across the t errain database using Bresenbam's 
algorithm (Bresenbam[1965D. As each patch and grid on the Line of Sight is identified , it is 
systematically searched to determine if any terrain feature (base terrain, treel:ines, buildings, 
etc.) on it blocks the intervisibility. 
This process is computationally expensive because all the edges of the polygons in the grids 
containing the LOS must be checked to see whether they intersect th" LOS in two 
dimensions. If a polygon edgelLOS intersection is found, the algorithm calculates whether 
the intersection lies above the LOS or below it in three dimensions. If the intersection is 
ahove the LOS, the LOS is blocked by the polygon edge; otherwise the LOS passes above the 
edge and is unblocked by that edge. 
The la rge number of polygon edgeILOS tests, the complexity of determining the intersections, 
and establishing whether the intersections lie above or below the LOS produce a time 
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consuming computation. The time complexity of the algorithm is expressed as the sum of the 
times to determine: 
Point location: 
0(1) time (simple arithmetic on the point's coordinates suffices). 
Line intersection: 
O(e) time per grid, where e is the number of polygon edges in the grid. 
Features: 
O(m) time per grid, where m is the number of feature segments in the grid. 
4.2. The sightings list and intervisibility update duration 
Each entity in the simulation keeps track of its sighting status to other entities by 
maintaining a sightings list. A sightings list is a linear array that is a snapshot of the 
intervisibility status in the simulation for an entity. 
The sightings list is a doubly linked list containing SIGHTINGS_ENTRY records. Each 
SIGHTINGS_ENTRY record describes the entity on whom sighting is being done, i.e., the 
target entity. It contains a pointer to the target's "dead reckoning model" which describes its 
"dynamics" information, for example, its velocity. Other fields in the SIGHTINGS_ENTRY 
contain the time when the target entity was last sighted, the current visibility status, and the 
highest visibility status attained so far. The visibility status indicates intervisibility status, 
i.e., LOS_ERROR, LOS_INVISIBLE, LOS_DETECTED, LOS_RECOGNIZED and 
LOS_IDENTIFIED. These levels refer to how well the entity can see the target entity. 
During an intervisibility update, an entity does point-to-point intervisibility determinations 
to all target entities within visual range. Depending on the result of the point-to-point 
intervisibility determination (can the target entity be seen?) the status of the target entity is 
updated. New entities (those not already on the sightings list) are added to the list. Target 
entities which have remained invisible for a time greater than the "sighting persistence" 
limit are removed from the sightings list. 
Receipt of an intervisibility update message triggers an entity to do its intervisibility update. 
When the intervisibility update is completed, the entity sends itself another intervisibility 
update message. Table 4.2-A gives a description of the terms used in connection with 
intervisibility update durations and rates. 
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Term 
IUD 
IUR 
BUD 
BUR 
Table 4.2·A Intervisibility update durations and rates. 
Description 
Intervisibility Update Duration. This is the time between successive 
intervisibility updates and can vary as the simulation proceeds. In the 
1ST CGF Testbed this is measured in one hundredths of a second. For 
example, an IUD of 25 means that intervisibility updates would be done 
every 0.25 seconds. A lower bound on the IUD depends upon the 
simulation load and the type of hardware that is used for the simulation. 
Intervisibility Update Rate. This is the frequency of the intervis ibility 
updates and is the inverse of IUD. Thus, an IUD of 25 yields an IUR of 4 
(i.e., 4 updates per second ). 
Base Update Duration. The IUD is initially set to this value which is 
read from a configuration file (sim.lod). The BUD is a constant for the 
simulation and is also measured in one hundredths of a second. A lower 
bound on the BUD depends upon the simulation load and the type of 
hardware that is used for the simulation. 
Base Update Rate. This is the initial frequency of the intervisibility 
updates and is the inverse of the BUD. It remains constant throughout 
the simulation. 
Ideally, an IUD of25 would cause an entity to do 4 intervisibility updates per second (an IUR 
of 4), while an IUD of 400 would, ideally, cause the entity to do 1 update every 4 seconds (an 
IUR of 0.25). Ifwe are using an IUD of 100, we expect updates to be done at t+1 seconds, t+2 
seconds, etc. The "ideal" IUR is always a maximum because of the systems clock granularity 
and various kinds of system overhead. 
Assuming an intervisibility update requires "'t seconds and the IUD is t seconds, the 
intervis ibility updates would occur every t+"'t seconds without adjustment. To maintain the 
expected rate, messages should be queued with delays of t ·M seconds rather than t seconds . 
Even this will fail to establish the desired rate because messages may be arbit rarily delayed 
in an overloaded system. It should be noted that the standard 1ST CGF Testbed makes no 
such adjustment; the user specifies a duration and this is used as specified. The actual 
intervisibility update rate varies with the intervisibility algorithm and system load, but is 
a lways less than 1001IUD. 
Although at lower IURs (i .e., high IUDs) these delays are insignificant, one type of heuristic 
to be examined later Continuous Intervisibility Determination Avoidance (eIDA), Section 
5.1.5, requires precise message delays because of the high message rates involved. Messages 
in the system are always "late" because of other messages ahead of them in the message 
queue, the computer's clock granularity, and other factors. The high message rate requested 
for CIDA heuristics exacerbates this problem even further . In order to achieve the message 
rate for these heuristics, the software makes an adjustment to the message delay. 
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4.3. Modifying the 1ST CGF Testbed's intervisibility process 
To accomplish the research objectives of this effort, several changes to the 1ST CGF Testbed 
had to be implemented. For example, the intervisibility heuristics implemented require some 
historical information to avoid going arbitrarily long without doing all intervisibility 
determination. To retain historical and other heuristic specific information, all intervisibility 
"scratch" area was added to the dead reckoning structure for use within the intervisibility 
code. The structure of this data is known only within the intervisibility code and varies with 
the heuristic . All of the heuristics keep an indication of the last time an intervisibility 
determination was done. 
The standard CGF Testbed Simulator contains some intervisibility heuristics and a sighting 
model used to filter sightings based on human vision. These elements of the Simulator were 
removed as only a physical intervisibility sighting was of interest (the sighting model 
depends on the intervisibility code, not the other way around). 
Other minor modifications to the CGF Testbed were made to allow statistics about the 
intervisibility determinations to be automatically gathered. 
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5. Intervisibilitv heurjstjcs 
The intervisibility heuristics implemented as part of this project and their characteristics are 
represented by Table 5-A. A "X" in a column means the characteristic is supported by the 
implemented heuristic. Note that discrete heuristics are also known as coarse-grain 
heuristics and continuous heuristics are also known as fine-grain heuristics. 
Table 5-A Implemented h euristics a nd their characteristies. 
Ch aracteristic 
Heu ristic Composite Discr e t e Con tinuous 
(coarse-J!'I'ain) (fine-J!'I'ain) 
Varying the BUR 
Symmetry (Sym) X 
History (His) X 
Sighter-based (Sgt) X X 
Target-based (Trg) X X 
Fine-grain history (Fgh) X 
Fine-grain sighter (Fgs) X X 
Fine-grain target (Fgt) X X 
Section 5.1 discusses the different types of heuristics. 
Section 5.2 discusses the intervisibility update rate (lUR) limits associated with discrete and 
continuous intervisibility determination avoidance heuristics. 
Section 5.3 discusses the overheads incurred in employing a heuristic and processing 
additional messages (for discrete and continuous heuristics). 
Section 5.4 gives a description of the implemented heuristics and the rational behind them. 
Some key variables used by these heuristics and how they vary as the simulation proceeds is 
discussed there. 
5.1. Types of h e u ristics 
Generally, intervisibility heuristics are of two types: the physical and the behavioral 
heuristics. Physical heuristics attempt to reduce the number of intervisibility determinations 
by using some physical characteristic of intervisibility whereas behavioral heuristics exploit 
vehicle behavior in their attempt to reduce the number of intervisibility determinations. 
A good example of a physical heuristic is the symmetry heuristic (discussed in Section 5.l.2). 
It is based on the fact that due to the nature of light if A can see B then B can see A. Thus, 
the physical nature of light is the basis behind this heuristic . In a literal sense this is not 
really a heuristic because a heuristic by definition involves some "guessing" or 
approximation. There is no guessing about symmetry because the intervisibility relation is 
symmetric . 
Behavioral heuristics attempt to reduce the intervisibility determinations by using some 
behavior being done by an entity; for example, a destroyed entity need not update 
intervisibility because having intervisibility to a destroyed vehicle is of no interest to the 
Simulator. The various coarse-grain and fine-grain heuristics are all behavioral heuristics . 
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5.1.1. Varying the base update rate 
As already mentioned (Section 4.2), an intervisibility update for an entity is initiated by the 
receipt of an intervisibility update message. Updates may be made more frequent by 
increasing the frequency of these messages. The frequency is controlled by the intervisibility 
update duration (IUD). The IUD is initially set to the base update duration (BUD), which is 
defined by the user in a support file (sim.lod) 
In situations where a battle is fought in obstructed or hilly terrain, a slow intervisibility 
update rate may have a deleterious effect on the scenario. For example, sightings that could 
have been possible during periods ofbriefintervisibility may be missed beca se ofa low IUR. 
Hence, entities that could have been destroyed earlier may survive to inflict damage on their 
potential destroyers, thus changing the scenario altogether. 
5.1.2. Symmetric heuristic 
As already noted, intervisibility is symmetric (if A can see B then B can see A) and, equally 
important, lack of intervisibility is also symmetric (if A cannot see B then II cannot see A). 
An obvious heuristic is to inform B when A determines (through a point-to-point 
intervisibility determination) that A H B. The symbol "H" stands for "can see". This result 
is kept in the intervisibility scratch area for B. When B does an intervisibility determination, 
it first consults the scratch area for a previously generated result. Stored along with the 
result is the time at which A H B was determined. The time must be recorded because there 
may be a time interval between when A determines the A-to-B result and when B references 
that result to determine whether B H A. If the interval is "large", it is assumed that A or B 
has moved enough to invalidate the determination and it is recalculated. If the interval is 
"small", the result supplied by A is accepted. It is this time element that mal,es symmetry a 
heuristic. Without it A H B would always means B H A. 
5.1.3. History heuristic 
It is often the case that when the outcome of an experiment or observation is consistent over 
time, people begin to assume the next outcome or observation will be the same. If a die is 
cast many times and always turns up 6, observers will eventually become convinced the 
result will continue to be 6 and will stop observing the rolls. This is not necessarily a bad 
thing; in the case of the die it is likely the die has a gimmick. In survival s ituations, 
spending less time on one activity frees time for other actions. 
For the problem at hand, it is reasonable to assume that if we have had intervisibility to a 
target for a "long" time, we will still have intervisibility the next time we check. In such a 
situation, we are likely to be operating in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle of interest. 
Similarly, if we have not had intervisibility to a vehicle for a "long" time, it is likely we will 
not have intervisibility the next time we check. In this case, we may be impossibly distant 
from the target. 
The history heuristic is based on these ideas . The heuristic tracks the number of consecutive 
intervisibility determinations that have returned the same intervisibility value. When a 
threshold value is passed, intervisibility determinations are skipped effectively reducing the 
update rate. When a transition is made (sighted to not-sighted or vice versa), skips are again 
inhibited until a sufficient history accumulates. 
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Consider the following scenario: 
A 
In this case, A observes B four times before it is obscured. B is then not in sight for 10 
updates, then comes back into sight for 3 (transitions come in bursts). In this case 2 
transitions occurred in 17 checks. In actual combat situations much more favorable r atios 
(fewer transitions per check) can be expected, since entities may be kilometers apart with 
many intervisibility obstacles. 
It can be argued that this technique simply decreases the IUR. If transitions are rare this is 
true: a transition will occur and skipping will engage before the next transition. Hence, the 
intervisibility check rate is effectively lower at the time of transitions. On the other hand, if 
transitions are common, the IUR will increase at the first transition and repeated transitions 
will keep the rate high . 
In actual combat situations, it is assumed transitions (as shown in the diagm m above) mil 
come in bursts (several transitions followed by long gaps without transitions). In such a 
situation, there may be some delay for the first transition detection, but thE! others will be 
rapidly recognized . 
Whereas the discrete history heuristic simply produces a binary result (skip, do not skip), the 
fine-grain mechanism allows the heuristic to produce a range of va lues which are mapped to 
the number of skips to be done. 
5.1.4. Discrete intervisibility determination avoidance heuristics (DIDA) 
The basic idea is to reduce intervisibility computation by skipping some of the intervis ibility 
determinations for an entity. The role of the heuristic is to decide when to skip. 
For discrete avoidance the IUR, which had been initially set to the BUR, is not modified . 
Intervisibility rate reduction is accomplished by skipping selected A-to-B intervisibility 
determinations. The main fault with this technique is its granularity. If the BUR is set as 
low (i.e., as infrequent) as is practical for realistic behavior, any skip (unless cunningly 
selected) is apt to cause behavior deterioration due to missed sightings. A natural tendency 
is to increase the BUR when discrete avoidance techniques are employed . DIDA heuris tics 
are also known as coarse-grain heuristics. 
Boolean heuristics are desired for discrete intervisibility determinations. The only choice is 
either to skip or not to skip the A-to-B intervisibility determination under consideration. 
Many heuristics lend themselves to this approach. For example, they a re along the lines of 
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"skip if we did not skip the last check, we got the same result the last M times we checked, 
and we did not see an enemy approaching in the last N checks." Of course, the value 
returned when a skip is done should agree with the last value r eturned. It is unlikely we can 
predict a transition from not-sighted to sighted or vice versa . 
5.1.5. Continuous intervisibility determination avoidance heuristics (CIDA) 
Continuous avoidance means that the interval between intervisibility determinations (IUD) 
is not necessarily an integer multiple of the BUD. The heuristics guess how long it is safe to 
wait until the next intervisibility determination based on the behavior of the entities in the 
simulation. CIDA heuristics are also known as the fine-grain heuristics. 
An optimal continuous avoidance algorithm would require separate intervisibility update 
messages for each A-to-B intervisibility determination being considered. Because the time 
for the individual intervals could be any positive value, optimal delays could be used for the 
various intervisibility determinations . This approach was not seriously considered for this 
project because of technical problems in starting up and shutting down such a process, and 
the considerable programming and run time overhead involved. 
Another approach is to adjust the interval between intervisibility update messages. This h as 
the disadvantage of delaying a complete intervisibility update by an entity in order to delay a 
specific A-to-B intervisibility determination. In cases where all of the A-to-B intervisibility 
determinations are willing to wait, the update rate may be slowed (at leas t temporarily). 
This approach was not used in these experiments. 
One practical technique is to approximate continuous delays for individual intervisibility 
determinations by using a relatively high IUR (in comparison to the BUR) in combination 
with the discrete techniques. This is called "fine-grain" check avoidance. 
This approach is supported in these experiments. With suitable parameter adjustments (no 
algorithmic changes), the fine-grain technique will delay most intervisibility determinations 
most of the time and "intelligently" select which A-to-B intervisibility determinations should 
be applied for a given intervisibility message event (or an intervisibility updat e). With a high 
IUR, a reasonable approximation of arbitrarily selected delays between A-to-B intervisibility 
determinations is feasible. 
For continuous avoidance, the heuristics used should yield a continuum of values . For 
convenience, all such functions are constrained to yield a range from zero to one. Zero 
indicates a minimum delay should be used (another intervisibility determination is needed 
soon ), whereas one indicates the next intervisibility determination may be delayed by the 
maximum allowed interval. The latter remark indicates a primary assumption of the project, 
every heuristic has a maximum allowed delay (which is the same as a minimum update rate; 
see Section 5.2). 
The IUR should be high enough to approximate continuous delays substantially better than 
the BUR. But care should be taken that a high IUR (a low IUD) does not overload the 
system to the extent of degrading the behavior. Moreover , these changes should be 
transparent to the user who expects the checks to happen at the BUR. 
In these experiments the IUR is obtained by multiplying the BUR by a RATE factor. This 
value indicates the number of times intervisibility checks are actually requested by the 
system as a multiplier of the BUR. Appendix AA discusses why a RATE value of 4 was used 
for the CIDA or fme-grain heuristics. 
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5.1.6. Composite heuristics 
The composite heuristics are composed of sub-heuristics which vote whether to do an 
intervisibility determination. Each sub-heuristic computes a metric (M) value based on 
certain characteristics of the current simulation state. The computed metrics for the various 
sub-heuristics are used to determine a weighted average. If the weighted average exceeds a 
threshold, an intervisibility determination will be skipped. 
Sighter and target-based heuristics (Table 5-A) lend themselves to being composite 
heuristics. Composite heuristics can be either discrete (coarse-grain) or continuous (fine-
grain). For example, the sighter-based heuristics occur as discrete ("Sgt") or continuous 
("Fgs") versions. Whether a heuristic is composite or not is independent of whether it is 
discrete or continuous. 
5.2. Update rate limits for heuristics 
This section discusses the intervisibility update rate limits for CIDA and DIDA heuristics. 
Although heuristics could make recommendations for arbitrarily long delays between 
updates, it is unlikely that very low IURs would be effective . None of the heuristics designed 
could be expected to correctly predict long transition free periods (unle:;s a vehicle is 
destroyed). 
To prevent serious sighting delays, all the heuristics use a minimum sighting rate of half the 
user 's requested rate (BUR), unless a vehicle is destroyed; some heuristics prevent further 
sighting to or by destroyed vehicles. Given a BUR of 4.0, this ensures that after a sighting at 
to another sighting will occur no later than (to+O.5) seconds. 
5.2.1. Discrete h e uristics 
The coarse-grain heuristics receive update messages at the same rate as the user specified 
(the BUR). Using the scratch area, these heuristics ensure that only one intervisibility 
determination is skipped for any two consecutive messages. Thus, for a BUR of 1.0, if an 
intervisibility determination is done at to, the next determination will occur at either (to+ 1.0) 
or (to+2.0). 
5.2.2. Continuous heuristics 
This section discusses the minimum, maximum, and possible intervisibility update rates for 
continuous heuristics . 
5.2.2.1. The minimum update rate for continuous heuristics 
The intervisibility scratch area is used to keep an indication of the last time an intervisibility 
determination was accomplished. When an intervisibility message arrives this fi eld is 
checked and, if necessary to avoid too great a gap between updates, an intervisibility 
determination is forced. When this happens in a fine-grain heuristic, the heuristic is invoked 
to determine a new interval before the next determination. For example, when a fine-grain 
heuristic recommends a delay that would give too low an IUR, an intervisibility 
determination will be forced at the minimum sighting rate (see Section 5.2). On the other 
hand , if the heuristic demands a determination sooner than that required by the minimum 
sighting rate, the request is honored up to the point described in Section 5.2.2.2. 
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5.2.2.2. The maximum update rate for continuous heuristics 
Although it is reasonable to hope heuristics could predict times when an accelerated rate 
would be beneficial, that is not a goal of this project. To this end, heuristic's 
recommendations are always bounded above by the user requested rate (BUR). This ensures 
the CGF Testbed Simulator will not attempt to do more frequent intervisibility 
determinations than the base system. For example, given a BUR of 2.0, after a sighting at to 
another sighting will occur no sooner than (to+0.5) seconds. 
5.2.2.3. Possible update intervals for continuous heuristics 
For all the experiments completed, the fine-grain heuristics received messages at four times 
the rate required by the BUR. So, for a BUR of 1.0 messages per second messages were 
received (approximately) every 0.25 seconds. Given this, and the restrictions on the update 
rates, after an intervisibility determination at to, the next determination will occur at either 
(to+1.0), (to+1.25), (to+1.5), (to+1.75), or (to+2.0) seconds. 
To summarize, all the fine-grain heuristics contain code to ensure that intervisibility 
determinations are not done more often than the user. Removing this limiting code would 
cause the Simulator to do additional determinations when recommended by the heuristic, 
possibly increasing realism. However, the objectives of these experiments is to reduce the 
number of intervisibility determinations. Hence, these experiments bound the number of 
determinations at or below the user requested rate. 
5.3. Heuristics and message overhead 
The fme-grain technique increases the message handling overhead by increasing the number 
of intervisibility update messages sent. The finer the granula rity, the greater the overhead. 
On an individual Simulator, the number of additional messages, for a fixed granularity, is 
bounded. New remote vehicles, vehicles that have been created on other Simulators, add no 
new messages. Only the addition of local vehicles, vehicles that have been created on this 
Simulator, adds to the message load. 
The number of messages per unit time is easily computed as the message rate per vehicle 
times the number of vehicles. However, for the fine-grain updates the message rate is not 
the value requested by the user in the Simulator's configuration files (the BUR). 
The fine-grain heuristics are designed to increase the message rate according to a multiplier. 
When this parameter is 1 no additional messages are generated. When it is R, the requested 
rate will approximate R times the user requested rate (because of delivery overhead, which 
increases with R, the actual rate will be less than expected, and the discrepancy will increase 
as R is increased). For these experiments, R was set to 4 (see Section 5.2.2.3). 
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5.4. Implemented heuristics 
The heuristics implemented are: 
• Varying the intervisibility base update rate (BUR), 
• The symmetry heuristic, 
• The history heuristic (in coarse and fine· grain versions), and 
• The composite heuristics (in coarse and fine·grain versions) 
5.4.1. Varying the intervisibility base update rate 
This is implemented as discussed in Section 5.1.1 
5.4.2. Symmetry heuristic 
The symmetry heuristic is implemented as discussed in Section 5.1.2. 
5.4.3. History heuristic 
For a discussion of the history heuristic see Section 5.1.3. This section discusses the 
mechanism that recommends whether to skip or not. 
Both the coarse·grain and the fme·grain version of the history heuristic track the number of 
consecutive intervisibility determinations which have returned the same intervisibility value. 
In the coarse-grain version, the history of identical intervisibility values are compared to a 
threshold value. When the threshold value is exceeded, intervisibility determinations are 
skipped effectively reducing the update rate. When a sighting transition is made (sighted to 
not-sighted or vice versa), skips are inhibited until a sufficient history accumulates. The 
layout of the code ensures that the simulation doesn't go too long without doing an 
intervisibility determination between the two entities. 
The fine-grain version calculates a skip value after a sufficient sighting history accumulates; 
this value refers to the number of intervisibility determinations that can be safely skipped 
between a sighter and a target. Again, the layout of the code ensures that the simulation 
doesn't go too long without doing an intervisibility determination between the two entities. 
As is usual for the fme-grain heuristics, an upper bound on the IUR is maintained to prevent 
checking more often than the user requested rate. 
The formula used to calculate the skip value in the fine-grain version is: 
where: 
Matches Skip = RATE - I + (MAX _ SKIP - RATE + I) • 
In terval 
Skip 
Matches 
Interval 
is the number of fine·grain intervisibili ty determinations to be skipped 
for this sighter/target pair 
is the fine-grain multiplier OUR = RATE · BUR) 
is the maximum number of skips to preserve the minimum update rate 
(MAX_SKIP = 2 . RATE - 1) 
is the number of consecutive intervisibility determinations yielding the 
same result 
is the "full confidence interval". Once Matches equal s Interval the 
minimum update rate is used. This is a heuristic parameter . 
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When there have been no matches, Skip will be RATE - I, which yields an intervisibility 
update rate equal to the BUR. If the number of matches is as great as the interval, a 
heuristic parameter, the maximum number of skips will be done. The layout of the heuristic 
code prevents Skip values exceeding MAJCSKIP from delaying intervisibility determinations 
beyond the MAJCSKIP value. 
5.4-4- Composite heuristics 
The composite heuristics and the sighter and the target-based heuristics are discussed in the 
following sections. Recall that each component of a composite heuristic always computes a 
metric value (M) based on certain characteristics of the current simulation state . The metric 
computed by each sub-heuristic lies in the interval [O,lJ . Values exceeding 1 are mapped to 1 
while values below 0 are mapped to O. Section 5.4.4.1 discusses sighter-based sub-heuristics 
and give an equation to compute the metric (M). Section 5.4.4.2 discusses the target-based 
sub-heuristics and give an equation to compute the metric (M). 
Remember that the composite heuristics occur in both the coarse-grain and the fine-grain 
versions. 
5.4.4.1. Sighter-based heuristics 
Sighter-based heuristics attempt to reduce the number of intervisibility determinations done 
by an entity by taking its behavior into account. The behavior may be some physical action 
of the entity, such as being stationary, or it may be some abstract behavior, such as having 
permission to fire . 
Four sighter entity behaviors were characterized for this study: 
1. The movement of the sighter, 
2. The sighter's permission to fire, 
3. The sighter's ability to fire, and 
4. The proximity of the sighter to enemy entities 
In both the coarse-grain and fme-grain versions of the sighter-based heuristic, the rate at 
which the entity does intervisibility determinations is dynamically adjusted. 
The four sub-heuristics are assigned weights to increase or decrease their effects in deciding 
whether an intervisibility determination is required. A weighted average is computed to 
decide whether to do an intervisibility determination. In all cases, 0.0 indicat es to do an 
intervisibility determination and 1.0 indicates NOT to do an intervisibility determination . 
Any weight can be assigned to a sub-heuristic. The heuristic computes a metric for each 
behavior which is then multiplied by the weight assigned to it. For some behaviors this 
metric may be a boolean metric (0 or 1). For example, does an entity have permission to fire? 
For other behaviors this metric may be a floating point value; for example, the metric 
associa ted with the distance of a sighter to an enemy entity may be larg (small) if the 
sighter is near (far) from the enemy entity. 
The weighted average of the metrics for all the behaviors is guaranteed to be in the interval 
[O,lJ. The weighted average of the metrics is given by the following equation. 
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• 
I,wi .Mi 
Weighted _average = 2i.:1.''-.,---__ 
I, Wi 
/:::1 
where : 
wi is the weight assigned to a sub-heuristic i and 
Mi is the metric computed by heuristic I (Mi is in the interval [0,1)) 
For the coarse-grain heuristics, judging whether or not to skip an intervisibility 
determination requires that a split point (threshold) be determined within tltis range. If the 
weighted average is greater than the split point, an intervisibility determination should be 
skipped, whereas, a value less than the split value requires an intervisibility determination. 
The fine-grain s ighter heuristics are precise analogs to their coarse-grain versions. The key 
difference is tha t the composite vote of the heuristic elements no longer needs to be binary 
(no split point is needed) because the intervisibility determination is delayed by skipping 
intermediate fine-grain intervisibility determinations. 
In this case the number of fine-grain intervisibility determinations skipped is given by: 
where: 
Skip = RATE - 1 + ( MAX _SKIP - RATE + 1) • Weighted _average 
Skip 
RATE 
MAJCSKIP 
Weighted_average 
is the number of fine-grain intervis ibility determina tions to be 
skipped 
is the fine-grain multiplier (IUR = RATE · BUR) 
is the maximum number of skips to preserve the minimum 
update rate (MAX_SKIP = 2 · RATE - 1) 
is the weighted average of the metrics associated with each sub-
heuristic 
A weighted average of 0.0 will yield the maximum check rate (RATE-I ) while a value of 1.0 
will yield the minimum rate (MAJCSKIP). 
5.4.4.1.1. Moving and stationary 
This sub-heuristic is based on the premise that moving entities need to check intervisibility 
more often than stationary entities. A moving person wiJI look around the surroundings more 
often than a stationary person. 
This sub-heuristic requests the minimum rate for a stationary vehicle and the maximum r ate 
for a vehicle moving at its "normal speedtl • 
where: 
M 
- normal - current 
,-
normal 
normal is the normal speed of a vehicle (for example, 10 mls.) 
current is the current speed of the vehicle (in mls.) 
When a vehicle is stationary, its "current speed" is 0 and the value of the metric, M " is equal 
to 1. This means that the sub-heuristic requires an intervisibility determination to be 
22 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
skipped. As the vehicle builds up speed, its "current speed" rises with a corresponding 
decrease in the value of M l' When the "current speed" equals the "normal speed", M, is 0 
signifying that the sub-heuristic does not require any intervisibility determination to be 
skipped. 
5.4.4.1-2. Permission to fire 
It seems reasonable that entities that have permission to flre should conduct more 
intervisibility determinations than entities that do not (provided they are not destroyed). 
This sub-heuristic falls into the category of boolean sub-heuristics because an entity either 
does or does not have permission to flre . 
M, = 1.0 if entity has permission to flre, 0.0 otherwise 
5.4.4.1.3. Able to fire 
The ability to fIre may be lost by an entity after it has been hit by enemy fire. This sub-
heuristic also falls in the category of boolean behaviors. 
M3 = 1.0 if able to fire, 0.0 otherwise 
5.4.4.1.4. Proximity to target 
It seems natural that an entity would do more intervisibility determinations when it is in the 
vicinity of enemy entities than when it is far away from them. The entity is considered "in 
the range" of an enemy entity if is lies within the maximum range of any weapon possessed 
by the target entity. 
As the entity or sighter gets closer to the enemy or target entity more intervisibility 
determinations are done. 
where: 
d is the distance to the target entity 
r is the maximum range of any weapon possessed by the sighter entity 
5_4.4.2. Target-based heuristics 
Target-based heuristics reduce the number of intervisibility determinations done by a sighter 
to a particular target by taking into account the type, appearance and behavior of that 
target. Moreover, there is provis ion in the coarse-grain version to ignore targets that have 
been destroyed or have lost firepower and, thus, eliminate even the overhead of computing 
the weighted average. 
The implementation of the target based heuristics is very similar to the sighter-based 
heuristics except characteristics of the target are examined . 
Four target entity behaviors were characterized for this study: 
l. The relative movement of the sighter and target 
2. The estimated threat of the target 
3. Target damage status and 
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4. The proximity of the sighter to a target 
5.4.4.2.1. Relative movement of sighter and target 
The movement dimension to this heuristic uses both the sighter's and target's velocities to 
determine whether the vehicles are closing or separating and at what speed. The rational is 
that when the entities are closing, the sighter needs to more carefully watch the target . 
where: 
M5= 0.5 + 
2 • C 
R 
R is the rate at which the sighter and target are closing (in mlsec .), expected range 
[·C, C] 
C is the closing rate a t which maximum update rate is to be used (12 mlsec. in these 
experiments) 
If vehicles are separating rapidly R ~ - C, yielding M5 = o. If they are closing r apidly, 
R ~ C and M5 = 1. 
5.4.4.2.2. Estimated threat of target 
Sighters do more intervisibility determinations to targets that are considered more 
threatening than to targets that are less threatening. 
The ta rget's threat is determined by examining the priority the target has been given as a 
ta rget for the weapons the sighter carries; these priorities are configured by the user . If the 
target is top priority for any of the sighter's weapons, frequent intervisibility determinations 
a re recommended (va lue of 0.0). If the target is not a first , second , or third priority target for 
any of the sighter 's weapons, infrequent intervisibility determinations are recommended 
(l.0). 
M . = l.0 if target is NOT first , second or third priority; 0.0 otherwise 
5.4.4.2.3. Target damage status 
Damaged targets are given less at tention than healthy targets. If the target is destroyed or 
has no firepower , it is ignored (l.0). If it lacks mobility, it receives reduced a ttention (0.5), 
otherwise it receives maximum at tention (0.0). 
M, = l.0 if target has firepower kill or is destroyed; 0.5 if it has mobility kill; 
0.0 otherwise 
5.4.4.2.4. Proximity to targe t 
Entities check more often when an enemy entity is relatively close . Close i,; computed in 
terms of the target's firing range, and the amount of attention paid is proportional to its 
distance (zero yields 0.0, a distance exactly equal to the target 's fi ring range yields l.0). 
M8= 
d 
r 
where: 
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d is the distance to the target entity 
r is the maximum range of any weapon possessed by the target entity 
This behavior is similar to the case in the sighter-based heuristics where a sighter varied its 
intervisibility update rate to a target depending on their relative distance. However, in one 
case the sighter's maximum weapons' range is used to determine its intervisibility update 
rate while in the other, the target's maximum weapons' range is used. 
In Figure 5.4.4.2.4-A the circles represent the maximum range of weapons of entities A and 
B. Consider the sighter-based sub-heuristic with A being the sighter entity and B the target 
entity. A's intervisibility update rate should not increase because B is beyond its (the 
sighter's) maximum range of weapons. However , if B is the sighter entity, B's intervisibility 
update rate should increase. 
In contrast, consider the target-based sub-heuristic with A being the sighter entity and B 
being the target entity. A's intervisibility update rate should increase. When B is the sighter 
entity, B's intervisibility update rate should not increase. 
Table 5.4.4.2.4-A summarizes the difference: 
Table 5.4.4.2-4·A Effect of sub-heuristic on sighter's intervisibility update rate 
Type of sub-heuristic 
Sighter Sighter-based Target-based 
A No increase Increase 
B Increase No increase 
• B 
Figure 5.4.4.2.4-A Sighter and target maximwn weapons' ranges 
In these experiments , the vehicle's maximum weapons' ranges were identical. For simplicity. 
the target's maximum weapons' range was used for both sighter and target based sub-
heuristics . 
25 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6. Evaluation of the interyisibility heuristics 
Evaluation of the heuristics requires: 
• Establishing the performance metrics, 
• Data collection, and 
• Heuristic ranking based on effectiveness. 
This section addresses these points in detail. 
6.1. Evaluation experiment 
The performance of the intervisibility heuristics was evaluated in the context of a set of three 
standard military scenarios, to be described later. 
The performance of the CGF Testbed Simulator in the area of intervisibility was measured 
and compared for heuristic and "base" versions in each scenario. The "base" versions did not 
incorporate any heuristics; i .e., they were "no-heuristic" versions . lntervisibil.ity performance 
was considered in terms of number of intervisibility determinations performed , sighting 
event times, and heuristic computational overhead. 
A "sighting event" or "sighting" refers to the event of an unblocked line of sight being 
detected by an intervisibility determination for two entities for which there was no such line 
of sight just prior to the event. For example, a sighting event would occur when an entity 
crested a ridge and became visible to a hostile entity on the other side of the ridge and that 
fact was identified by an intervisibility determination between those two entities . The 
"sighting event time" is the simulation time of such an event. 
This section discusses the performance metrics and the process of data gathering for the 
evaluation. 
6.1.1. Performance metrics 
The following data was gathered: 
• The total number of sighting events, 
• The time at which each sighting event occurred, the IDs of the sighter and target 
entities, and their locations, and 
• The time, measured in clock ticks, at various stages of the intervisibility checking 
process. 
The set of sighting events and sighting event times found by the no-heuristic version for a 
particular scenario is taken to be the "true" or Ilcorrect" set. When a heuris tic is judged 
against the no-heuristic version the following cases arise: 
• Sighting events may be missed by a heuristic 
• There may be extra sighting events in the heuristic output 
• Sighting events may be delayed 
• Sighting events may occur earlier 
Some s ightings will be missed or be extra because of sampling error. Using coarse BUDs (l/2 
second or more) in the test scenarios makes it inevitable that some transitions will be missed, 
both by the heuristic version (labeled "missed") and by the no-heuristic version (labeled 
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"extra"). The real question is how many sightings are missed because of delayed checking. 
Extra sightings are always from sampling error since the heuristics never do more frequent 
checks than the no-heuristic version of the system. It seems likely (and experiments support 
this) that the greater the average sighting delay for the System Under Test (SUT) the more 
misses will be recorded. 
It is possible that the computational cost of computing some heuristic may exceed the cost of 
doing a real intervisibility determination. Both the sighter and target-based heuristics are 
quite complex, particularly when all their components are active. It is, therefore, not enough 
to simply count the number of intervisibility determinations done, r ather , a comprehensive 
eva luation is needed that takes the computational cost of the heuristics in acc:ount. 
Because the fine-grain heuristics produce a large number of internal messages, heuristics of 
this type must consider the message delivery overhead. With a sufficient RATE multiplier , 
the Simulator will spend most of its time delivering messages . It is necessary to account for 
this time both to determine an optimal multiplier and to evaluate the overa ll resul ts. 
To accomplish this, each time a clock interrupt occurs, the interrupt handler determines 
whether intervisibility code is active and, if so, at what level (message delivery, heuristic 
processing, or in the actual intervisibility computations). The results are formatted to 
indica te how much time was spent on the overall intervisibility calculations and on the 
individual par ts of the intervisibility process. 
It was found that message delivery time was a minor issue. Measurements yield delivery 
time on the order of 114 to 112 milliseconds (4000-2000 deliveries/sec.) . As the number of 
targets rises the issue becomes even less important. (If there are no targets, all the 
intervisibility time is in overhead, and delivery time may be important). 
On the other hand, overhead for heuristics is proportional to the number of targets . If I is 
the number of loca l vehicles and m is the number of remote vehicles, the heuristic overhead 
is proportiona l to their product I , m, but message delivery is proportional to I only. 
With this in mind, the sighting delays and the computational overhead of a heuristic are 
used in measuring the "cost" of the heuristic. 
6.1.1 .1. Savings calculation 
Naively, it may seem that the effectiveness of using a heuristic is the difference between the 
number of point-to-point intervisibility determinations expected by a user for the scenario 
with a particular setting of the BUD and the number of point-to-point. in tervisibility 
determinations actually done by a scenario. This is not true because the savings obt ained 
may be optimistic as the heuristic overhead has not been taken into account. [f t he overhead 
to use the heuristic is high , the savings from a reduction in the number of intervis ibili ty 
determinations may be offset . It is the net savings that must be used to evaluate the qu ality 
of a heuristic, not just the reduction in intervisibility computations. 
The effectiveness of a heuristic is represented as the ratio of its savings to the eost the system 
has to incur to use it. Thus, we have: 
where: 
E h,s is the effectiveness of heuristic h for scenario s 
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Sh,s is the savings in the number of intervisibility determinations achieved by 
heuristic h for scenario s 
Ch,s is the cost of using heuristic h for scenario s. 
Table 6.l.l.1-A tabulates the data used to compute the Ouerhead Multipl ier (OM). The OM 
for a heuristic is a measure of the overhead associated with using that heuristic. It is defined 
as the ratio of the total time spent processing point-to-point intervisibility determinations 
between vehicles with the heuristic to the total time spent in doing these determinations 
without a heuristic. The OM for each heuristic was computed by using a scenario consisting 
of 6 Blue and 6 Red circling vehicles so as to generate the maximum number of intervisibility 
checks. The invariable nature of the OM for each h euristic eliminates the need for 
computing it for each scenario (to be discussed later ). 
where: 
Heur 
Raw 
Tics 
traw 
OM 
Table 6.1.1.1-A Computing the overhead multiplier. 
Heur Raw Tics t,."W' OM 
Sym 266888 5223 4949 l.06 
His 281911 5277 5227 l.01 
Sgt 278664 5298 5167 1.03 
Trg 269185 5255 4991 1.05 
Fgh 280370 5284 5202 1.02 
Fgs 283475 5284 5256 1.005 
Fgt 276631 5288 5132 1.03 
Name of the heuristic (refer to Section 5) 
Number of point-to-point intervisibility determinations don e 
Total time spent by the SUT exercising intervisibility code (includes a ll 
heuristic overhead) 
Time that would be taken if no h euristic was being used to do the ch ecks 
(traw ; Raw I 53.9) 
Overhead multiplier (OM; Tics I trawl 
The denominator 53.9 used in computing traw is the number of point-to-point intervisibility 
determina tions done per clock tick without using any heuristic. It is used to give an estimate 
of the time it would take, in clock ticks, to do the same number of intervisibility checks as 
that done by a h euristic. The clock tick is a measure of the granularity of the system clock. 
The clock in the personal computer used for the CGF Simulator ticks every 0.054945 seconds. 
After the overhead multiplier h as been determined, the savings Sh,s can be determined. 
where '1 is the number of sightings that heuristic h does in scenario s and Oh is the OM for 
heuristic h . 
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Example: 
Assume the "Trg" heuristic does only 75% of the intervisibility determinations done by the 
no-heuristic version in the same scenario, thus showing an apparent saving of 25%. 
However, if it has an overhead multiplier of 1.05 the real saving is: 
Sh,s = 1- (0.75 x1.05) = 0.2125 or 21.25% 
6.1.1.2. Missed and extra sightings calculation 
It may seem that a heuristic should be penalized for "missed" sighting events. A sighting 
event is considered "missed" by a heuristic if it failed to produce a sighting event found by the 
no-heuristic version. It may be argued that a heuristic must be "bad" if it misses many 
sighting events (and "good" if it does not). However , the situation is more complicated than 
that. 
When a scenario is repeated results from the second run are not generally the same as in the 
first run. Small system perturbations from various non-deterministic !!vents, such as 
network packet delivery times, have cumulative effects resulting in different intervisibility 
determination sampling (although the frequency is the same). For a BUD of 1.0, if an entity 
becomes visible for less than a second, any given run may miss the event while another 
might see it. This at first may seem unlikely but the scenarios often offer opposing vehicles 
separated by kilometers of busy terrain. Such conditions often yield very short periods of 
visibility. 
It was found that a no-heuristic simulator run against the test scenarios showed 
approximately 5% variability from run to run in terms of missed and extra sightings. For 
example, if two runs are made with the identical no-heuristic version and compared, the 
second will typically show about 5 extra signings and 5 missed sightings for each 200 
sighting events in the run. In this case, the labels are absolutely correct: sightings labeled 
"extra" are sightings found in the second run and missed in the first run; sightings labeled 
"missed" are those found in the first run but not found for the second run. The values are 
usually about equal because neither run has any advantage; ultimately both figures 
represent sightings missed by test runs. 
It would be difficult to directly reflect the missed events in the computation of the heuristic's 
cost. One r eal difficulty to overcome, beyond the variability problem, was how to allow for 
the misses generated by sighter and target-based heuristics which intentionally "missed" 
many sightings (such as from or to destroyed vehicles). Misses, other than those caused 
through sampling variation, are closely tied to the mean and standard deviation for the 
sighting delays. Heuristics that delayed sightings greatly are prone to miss sightings. 
Analysis of the results of the combat scenarios (see Section 6.1.2), excluding the sighter and 
target data, revealed a positive correlation between the raw metric used for evaluation and 
the number of misses seen for the heuristidscenario trial. The correlation was not very high 
(correlation coefficient was 0.374). The low correlation, the variability from Tun to run, and 
the difficulty of accounting for the misses led us to ignore this factor in evaluation . 
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6.1.1.3. Sighting delay calculation 
The "sighting delay" is the difference in the simulation times of the same sighting event in 
the heuristic and no-heuristic version. The sighting delays must be a factor in determining a 
heuristic's cost (and hence its effectiveness). A heuristic should be penalized for delays; a 
heuristic that "sees" events earlier is preferable to another that "sees" them later. The 
absolute mean of the delays is used as one of the measures of the cost of using a heuristic. 
One may argue that the mean of the signed delays should have been used instead of the 
absolute value, because if there are early sightings by a heuristic, it should be credited for it . 
However, the heuristics are not designed to sight earlier and most of the sighting's delays are 
positive. There may be some negative delays in sightings (i.e., sightings were done earlier) 
but these are generally due to sampling variations . A heuristic should not be given credit for 
sampling variations and so a signed value should not be used. 
Another parameter used in the cost equation is the standard deviation of the absolute delays. 
If two heuristics have the same sightings delays, the heuristic having a smaller standard 
deviation is preferred over the other. 
Although the cost of a heuristic should rise with the standard deviation, the standard 
deviation is deemed to be of less importance than the mean. To reduce the impact of the 
standard deviation its square root is used. The square root of a positive number is closer to 1 
than the number itself, so using the square root of the standard deviation in the product 
rather than the standard deviation itself will result in the devia tion contributing less to the 
metric. This has the net effect of requiring the standard deviation to quadruple to have the 
same impact as doubling the mean. 
6.1.1.4. Heuristic cost calculation 
Combining the cost parameters we obtain the following equation for the raw measure of the 
cost of using a heuristic h for scenario s. 
where: 
Rh,s 
Ii 
cr 
Rh, s = Il- * .Jcr 
is the raw measure of the cost of using heuristic h for scenario s 
is the absolute mean of the sighting delays induced by heuristic h for scenario s 
is the absolute standard deviation of the sighting delays 
As mentioned earlier (Section 6.l.l.2), two runs of the same version of the Simulator will not 
do the same sightings; there is about a 5% run to run variation in missed events. Moreover, 
the sightings done in the two runs do not happen at the same time, even thoUI:h the scenario 
unfolds the same time after time, thus causing sighting delays. The run to run variation is 
factored into the heuristic cost: 
where: 
10" . 
Ro .. , 
Ch,s is the cost of using heuristic h for scenario s 
Rh,s is the raw measure of the cost of using heuristic h for scenario s and 
30 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Ro,s is the nominal cost (variation) from run to run and is calculated from two runs 
of the no heuristic version 
After the cost of using a heuristic Ch,s is determined, the effectiveness Eh,8 is computed by 
dividing the savings Sh,s by the heuristic cost. 
Section 6.2 details the experimental results. 
6,1.2. Experimental design 
Three types of engagements were used to test the heuristics: 
• Meeting 
• Delay 
• Assault 
Six scenarios were developed; a mouement·only and a combat uerswn for each type of 
engagement. 
The experiment consisted of running the unmodified and several versions of the heuristically 
modified Simulator with each of these scenarios and collecting data for analysis. 
Recall that a sighting event is the transition between no intervisibility and intervisibility. 
For example, at the moment an entity comes from behind a treeline so a second vehicle can 
see it, two sighting events occur (1 for each vehicle). Data is collected as sighting information 
whenever the intervisibility between vehicles transitions from block£d to unblock£d. 
6.1.3. Test scenarios 
The scenarios use a wide variety of terrain. Rough terrain (undulating with many sight 
blocking features) was used to increase the opportunities for sighting events; such events are 
the basis for the heuristic's evaluations. The scenarios are described in Sections 5.1.3.1 
through 5.1.3.6, and the script files for the scenarios are given in Appendix A.'7 . All scenarios 
use the standard SIMNET Fort Knox terrain data base. 
6.1.3.1. Meeting scenario 
In this scenario, three opposing force (OPFOR or Red) platoons and three US (Blue) platoons 
converge at the bridge located at (40500,40000). The opposing and US forces are both using 
the same plan of attack: they send two platoons of infantry fighting vehicles to flank the 
other force, while covering the advance of the tanks and trucks to the bridge. 
For detailed information about each platoon see Table 6.1.3.1·A. 
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Platoon 
US 1 
US2 
US3 
OPFORI 
OPFOR2 
OPFOR3 
Table 6.l.3.1-A Meeting scenario. 
Starting Location Final Location Platoon strength Platoon Formation 
(40080,42591) (40032, 40419) 4:M2's Echelon 
(40455,42631) (40495, 40332) 2: Ml's Wedge 
2: M975's 
(41021, 42550) (40902, 40649) 4:M2's Echelon 
(39080, 37540) (40132,40100) 4 :BMP's Echelon 
(40212,37495) (40359, 40056) 2 : T72's Wedge 
2 : URAL 375F's 
(41169 37589) (41210 40325) 4:BMP's Echelon 
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Initial positions 
The US forces start north of the bridge at (40500, 40000), while the OPFOR are positioned 
south of the bridge (see Figure 6.l.3.I-A). The OPFOR has two platoons in echelon formation 
positioned to the right and left of the center platoon in wedge formation. The US forces have 
two platoons, one in column formation and one in echelon formation, to the left and right of 
the center platoon, which is in wedge formation . 
Platoon 1 Platoon 2 
K 
--Platoon 3 
Platoon 2 
Platoon 1 in column 
formation 
Platoon 3 
Figure 6.1.3.loA Initial positions. 
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Movement routes 
The forces have the same overall strategy, but their movements during the scenario are quite 
different since the OPFOR chooses a circuitous route while the US forces choose a more 
direct approach to the bridge (Figure 6.l.3 .I-B). The OPFOR maneuver around obstacles as 
they head north to their destinations. OPFOR Platoons 2 and 3 break formation to avoid 
entering the trees, so as to increase visibility. The forces reform once the visual obstacles are 
cleared. The US forces take a more direct approach. US Platoon I forms a column and 
avoids the steep terrain to the east and the river to the west. This formation is held 
throughout until the river is forded near the objective. US Platoon 2 heads directly 
southward and US Platoon 3 swings wide (but always in the southerly direction) to avoid 
colliding with US Platoon 2. 
""")0=1"\0 Platoon 1 OPFOR Platoon 2 
---- Platoon 3 
Platoon 2 
US platoon 1, traversing 
between river and cliff 
OPFOR Platoon 3, 
maneuvering 
around canopy 
Figure 6.l.3.I-B Movements of both forces. 
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Final positions 
As the scenario draws to a close, OPFOR Platoon 2 avoids a terrain hazard. To do this, they 
change their wedge into an echelon. As they pass the hazard, they resume their wedge 
formation until they reach their final position at the south end of the bridge. OPFOR Platoon 
1 and US Platoon 3 both take a final position at the top of steep terrain to achieve an optimal 
offensive position. OPFOR Platoon 3, having crossed the river, now continues north until 
reaching its final position. US Platoon I, having also crossed the river, reaches their final 
position in the valley. Finally, US Platoon 2 achieves its final position at the north foot of the 
bridge (Figure 6.1.3 .1-C). 
>< 
US Platoons 
OPFOR Platoon 2 
OPFOR Platoon 1 
Figure 6.l.3.l-C Final Positions. 
The combat version of the meeting scenario is the same as the standard meeting scenario 
except all entities have permission to fire at the enemy. This permission extends to the 
maximum range of their weapons (up to 4000 meters). 
As soon as both forces are within range, they begin firing TOW and spandrel missiles . Since 
the vehicles are just within weapons range, many of these missiles fall short of their intended 
target. When the vehicles are well within range of each other, enemies are destroyed 
rapidly. 
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6.1.3.2. Delay scenario 
In this scenario, the OPFOR is trying to delay the US force, while the OPFOR "main force" 
escapes to the west. (The main force does not actually exist in the scenario). The US forces 
do not "know" they are being delayed and believe they are pursuing the main force. 
For detailed information about each platoon see Table 6.1.3.2-A. 
Table 6.1.3.2·A Delay scenario. 
Platoon Starting Location Final Location Platoon strength Platoon Formation 
USI (23383, 23885) (21513,22663) 4:M2's Echelon 
US2 (23879,23141) (20852, 22553) 2 : Ml's Wedge 
2: M975's 
usa (23547, 21693) (20008, 22828) 4:M2's Echelon 
OPFORI (21025, 24105) (21159,21573) 2: BMP's Box (With fuel trucks 
2: T72's in the cen ter .) 
2 : URAL 375F's 
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Initial Positions 
The US forces start about 3000 meters to the east of the opposing force (Figure 6.1.3.2-A). 
US Platoon 2 
US Platoon 3 
OPFOR heading south 
Figure 6.1.3.2-A Initial positions. OPFOR in box formation h eads south. 
37 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Phase 1 
The first phase of the OPFOR delay strategy is to head south to draw the attention of the US 
platoons. Since the OPFOR platoon's movement to the south is quite visible, all US platoons 
head south to prevent the OPFOR from escaping in that direction. The OPFOR moves south 
until it acquires a defensive position behind a group of trees, while the US forces continue to 
head south and then take defensive positions to wait for a possible OPFOR break to the east 
(see Figure 6.1.3.2-B). 
US Platoon 1 
US Platoon 2 
OPFOR hiding behind treelines US Platoon 3 
Figure 6.1.3.2-B OPFOR takes up a defensive position. 
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Final phase 
Next, the US forces attack the vulnerable OPFOR. The main attack is lead by US Platoon 2. 
US Platoons 1 and 3 begin to flank the OPFOR to protect platoon 2 and to narrow the escape 
routes of the OPFOR platoon. When the US forces attack, the OPFOR retreats to the valley 
in the west. As they retreat, two T72s stay behind to cover the rest of the platoon's escape. 
After the main part of the OPFOR platoon is close to the edge of the valley, the T72s join in 
the retreat . The US forces continue their advance on the retreating OPFOR (Figure 6.l.3.2-
C). 
US Platoon 1 
US Pillatocln 2 
US platoon 3 
Figure 6.1.3.2-C The OPFOR retreats into the valley. 
The combat version of the delay scenario is the same as the standard delay scenario except 
all entities have permission to fire at the enemy. This permission extends to the maximum 
range of their weapons (up to 4000 meters). 
Since the vehicles are initially well within weapons range, the OPFOR capabilities are 
quickly destroyed by the US forces. Even though the US forces greatly outnumber the 
OPFOR, the OPFOR does a significant amount of damage to the US forces before it is 
destroyed. 
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6.1.3.3. Assault scenario 
In this scenario, one OPFOR platoon will try to defend a bridge while three US platoons 
att empt to take the bridge. 
For detailed information about each platoon see Table 6.1.3.3-A. 
Table 6.1.3.3·A Assault scenario. 
Platoon Starting Location Final Location Platoon strength Platoon Formation 
US1 (7370, 6593) (3216,8762) 4 :M2's Echelon 
US2 (7493,6703) (3179,9093) 2 :Ml's Wedge 
2: M975's 
US3 (7628, 6801) (3142, 9620) 4: M2's Echelon 
OPFOR1 (3718, 9105) Same 3: BMP's None 
1 : T72's 
2 : URAL 375F's 
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Initial pos itions 
The US forces start southeast of the bridge at (S012, 9170), while the opposing forces ar e 
positioned east of the bridge, with the T72 directly at the foot of the bridge as a last defender. 
The rest of the forces (BMPs and trucks) are positioned to the east and southeast of the 
bridge (Figure 6.l.S.S-A). 
OPFOR trucks 
US Assembly Area 
T72 Defending BMPs 
Figure 6.1.S.3·A Initial Positions of forces. 
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The assault 
The US force, having assembled to the southeast of the bridge, breaks into the three platoons 
(Figure 6.l.3 .3-B). US Platoon 1 swings west, moving along the tree lines, for a right flank 
attack on the opposing platoon. US Platoon 2 heads northwest for a direct assault on the 
bridge. US Platoon 3 swings northwest for a left flank attack on the opposing platoon. As 
US Platoons 1 and 2 emerge from the last tree lines before the objective, US Platoon 3 h eads 
north at double speed. During the entire US forces' assault of the bridge, the opposing forces 
hold their positions . 
US Platoon 1 Flank 
US Platoon 2 Direct Assault 
nA'Anriing OPFOR US Platoon 3 Left Flank 
Figure 6.1.3.3-B Movements of US forces. 
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Final positions 
This scenario ends when the US Platoon 2 and US Platoon 3 converge at the entrance of the 
bridge, while US Platoon I , positioned on higher ground, is positioned north of the bridge 
(Figure 6.1.3.3-C). 
US Platoon 1 
Bridge Assault Defending OPFOR 
Figure S.l.3.3-C Final assault on the bridge. 
The combat version of the assault scenario is the same as the standard assault scenario 
except all entities have permission to fire at the enemy. This permission extends to the 
maximum range of their weapons (up to 4000 meters). 
Since there is excellent cover for the US forces, combat does not ensue until the US forces are 
fairly close to the objective. Whenever intervisibility is achieved, the US forces are able to 
eliminate the BMP's positioned to the east and southeast of the bridge. However , because of 
its excellent position at the foot of the bridge, the OPFOR T72 does damage the offensive 
capabilities of the US forces as they begin their final assault of the bridge. 
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6.1.4. Data collection 
A project of this complexity requires the analysis of large amounts of data. The scenarios 
that were developed for the evaluation of heuristics ran from 6 to 10 minutes (Section 6.1.3). 
For each scenario, data was collected for 7 heuristics. Two runs were made without 
heuristics; one became the reference data, and the other a "base version" used to evaluate 
run to run variability. 
6.1.4.1. Scenario divergence 
Initially, data was collected by creating a point-to-point network (to reduce network 
processing) between two Simulators; each running its part of the scenario. This approach did 
not prove viable. Because of the ill conditioned nature of the experiment (refer Appendix 
A.6) a second run of a scenario would usually diverge from the first . Hence message delivery 
would not follow the same order which indirectly caused vehicles to travel slightly perturbed 
routes, leading to ever more important differences between the runs. By the end of a run of 
more than a few minutes the sighting event histories would be very different. 
It is impractical to compare the sighting data from two runs of the "same" scenario if the 
scenarios in question are different. In initial runs location variability of entities between 
runs were observed to vary by as much as 40 m or more. 
6.1.4.2. Logging the scenarios 
The problem of scenario divergence was solved by logging each scenario's network traffic. 
For the evaluation of a system, the logged data was re-played; the scenarios were re-created 
exactly in terms of the network activity. The logging process was automated to remove 
errors in synchronizing the start and end of the scenarios. Two personal computers ran the 
Simulators, while a third logged the network traffic. The entire arrangement was done on a 
three machine network, so there was no extraneous traffic. 
To automate data collection, one machine played the role of the Master and the other the 
Slave. When the Slave was started, it waited until it received a "go" message from the 
Master. 
Modifications were made to the Testbed to support the needed synchronization. The Slave is 
capable of giving itself a "wait" message with a "key." It is removed from the wait state only 
when a "wait complete" message arrives from the Master. The Slave verifies the key and, if 
it is correct, leaves the wait state. Also, a Master can cause a Slave to exit thE! simulation by 
sending an exit message. 
6.1.4.3. Scenario playback for testing heuristics 
After the scenarios had been logged, they were played back to generate test data for heuristic 
evaluation using a two PC point-to-point arrangement. One PC played the logged scenarios 
repeatedly, while the second PC ran a modified Simulator that did intervisibility tests 
between entities that were on remote machines. 
Whenever appearance packets arrived a dead-reckoning model was updated (or created if it 
did not exist). Intervisibility checks, including heuristic processing, were done between the 
entities' locations as given by the dead reckoning models. 
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6.2. Experimen tal results 
The following sections discuss the performance of the heuristics . The pllrformance of a 
heuristic is based on its performance in different scenarios. 
All the components of the sighter and target-based heuristics, both the fine and coar se-grain 
versions, were given equal weights so all of the components could be exercised (refer to 
Section 5.4.4.1 and Section 5.4.4.2 for a description of the sighter and target-based 
heuristics). It was not practical to examine permutations of the heuristic components and 
split points in the available time. 
6.2.1. Heuristics' p erformance by scen ario 
Each of the following subsections discusses an implemented heuristic: history, symmetry, 
sighter and target-based heuristics. 
The effect of varying the intervisibility base update rate (or BUR) will be examined in Section 
6.2.1.1. That section shows the results for each BUR setting. 
Table 6.2.1-A displays the data used to compute the run to run variance, an important factor 
in calculating a heuristic's cost (refer to Section 6.1.1.4 for a discussion on computing the 
heuristic cost). The I J.11 and the 101 values are obtained by running the no-heuristic version 
twice and comparing the data gathered by the two runs. 
T able 6.2.1-A Computin g run to run varian ce. 
Scenari o 1J.1 1 10 1 Ro., = I~I* M 
Meeting 0.21 0.34 0.122 
Delay 0.31 0.32 0.175 
Assault 0.26 0.39 0.162 
Meeting (C) 0.30 0.26 0.153 
Delay (C) 0.31 0.34 0.181 
Assault (C) 0.29 0.31 0.161 
The Ro,s column indicates the run to run variance for each scenario. To compute the cost, 
Ch,s, for each heuristic/scenario pair , the raw measure of the cost Rh,s of that 
heuristic/scenario pair is divided by the Ro,s value for the scenario s (see Section 6.1.1.4). 
In the following tables the headings are: 
Scenario 
Savings 
Rh,s 
The name of the scenario (refer to Appendix A.1) 
The (C) suffix refers to the combat version of the scenario. 
The absolute mean of the sighting delays caused by a heuristic 
The absolute standard deviation of the sighting delays caused by a 
heuristic 
The percentage of intervisibility checks saved 
The raw measure of the cost of using a heuristic 
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Ch,s The modified cost and is obtained by dividing Rh,s by Ro,s for the same 
scenario 
Eh,s The effectiveness of the heuristic 
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6.2.1.1. Varying the intervisibility base update rate 
Varying the base update rate (BUR) means varying the frequency or rate at which 
intervisibility update messages are sent to each vehicle in the simulation. Strictly speaking 
varying the BUR does not fall into the category of heuristics; it was implemented to see what 
effects, if any, different BURs would have on the sighting events. Varying the BUR is 
insensitive to battlefield events. In this section the term "LX.X" stands for a simulation run 
with a BUD of XX seconds between updates. 
The statistics for the Simulator with a BUR of 2 (i.e., 2 updates/second) is given in Table 
6.2.1.1-A and Figure 6.2.1.1-A. 
LO.5 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1.1-A LO.5 (BUR = 2) Effectiveness. 
I fll 
0.39 
0.38 
0.35 
0.43 
0.36 
0.34 
Eh,s 
I cr I Savings Rh,. 
0.26 -100.0 0.20 
0.26 -100.0 0.17 
0.24 -100.0 0.18 
0.28 -100.0 0.19 
0.26 -100.0 0.23 
0.25 -100.0 0.17 
MleIrg C\3q- PssaJt MleIrg C\3q- PssaJt 
~ ~ ~ 
Figure 6.2.1.1-A LO.5 (BUR = 2) Effectiveness. 
Ch,s Eh,. 
1.63 -61.3 
1.11. -90.3 
1.06 -94.4 
1.49 -67 .2 
1.01 -98 .6 
1.06 -94.7 
As can be seen, LO.5's effectiveness is uniformly negative because of the doubling of the BUR 
without a corresponding increase in the number of sightings . 
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The statistics of the data gathered by running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.67 (i .e., an 
update every 1.5 seconds) is shown in Table 6.2.1.1-B and Figure 6.2.1.1-B. 
Ll.5 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1.1-B L1.5 (BUR = 0.67) Effectiveness. 
I !11 
0.49 
0.47 
0.5 
0.44 
0.49 
0.53 
Eh,$ 
I cr I Savings Rh,s 
0.34 33.3 0.29 
0.4 33.3 0.30 
0.37 33.3 0.30 
0.33 33.3 0.30 
0.38 33.3 0.25 
0.4 33.3 0.34 
M3e1rg Delo; ""rut M3e1rg Delo; "" rut 
(0 (0 (0 
Figure 6.2.1.1-B L1.5 (BUR = 0.67) Effectiveness. 
Ch,s 
2.34 
1.70 
1.88 
1.65 
1.67 
2.08 
Setting the BUR to 0.67 updates/sec. results in positive effectiveness for a ll scenarios. 
48 
Eh,s 
14.2 
19.6 
17.7 
20.1 
19.9 
16.0 
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The statistics of the data gathered by running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.5 (an update 
every 2.0 seconds) is shown in Table 6.2.1.1-e and Figure 6.2.1.1-e. 
Table 6.2.1-1-e L2.0 (BUR = 0.5) Effectiveness. 
L2.0 1111 I cr I Savings Rh,s Ch.,s Eh,s 
Meeting 0.64 0.47 50.0 0.44 3.60 13.9 
Delay 0.66 0.52 50.0 0.49 2 .72 18.3 
Assault 0.68 0.52 50.0 0.46 3.03 l6.5 
Meeting (e) 0.61 0.47 50.0 0.48 2.73 18.2 
Delay (e) 0.65 0.5 50.0 0.42 2.54 19.6 
Assault (e) 0.7 0.5 50.0 0.49 3.07 16.2 
Eh,s 
IVteIrg Dslcy f>6saJt IVteIrg Dslcy f>6saJt 
(Q (0 (Q 
Figure 6.2.1-1-e L2.0 (BUR = 0.5) Effectiveness. 
Running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.5 results in positive effectivenes!l similar to the 
effectiveness of a BUR of 0.67 . 
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The statistics of the data gathered by running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.33 (an upda te 
every 3.0 seconds) is shown in Table 6.2.1.1-0 and Figure 6.2.1.1-0. 
Table 6.2.1.1-D 1.3.0 (BUR = 0.33) Effectiveness. 
1.3_0 IILI I cr I Savings Rh,s Ch, s Eh,s 
Meeting 1.06 0.77 66.6 0.93 7.62 8 .7 
Delay 1.07 0.79 66.6 0.97 5.43 12.2 
Assault 1.07 0.82 66.6 1.02 5.98 11.1 
Meeting (e) 1.14 0.76 66.6 0.95 6.50 10.2 
Delay (e ) 1.13 0.81 66.6 0.99 5.62 1l.8 
Assault (e) 1.11 0.82 66.6 1.01 6 .24 10.6 
Eh,s 
M3e1rg DB"" !'6saJt M3e1rg DB"" !'6saJt 
(Q (0 (Q 
Figure 6.2.1.1-D 1.3.0 (BUR = 0.33) Effectiveness. 
By comparing this data with the data for L2 .0 it can be seen that L3 .0 is not as effective as 
L2 .0. 
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The statistics of the data gathered by running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.25 (an update 
every 4.0 seconds) is shown in Table 6.2 .1.1-E and Figure 6.2.1.1-E. 
lA.O 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1.1-E lA.O (BUR = 0.25) Effectiveness. 
Eh,s 
1111 I cr I Savings Rh,s 
1.59 1.05 75.0 1.63 
1.65 1.2 75.0 1.81 
1.58 1.1 75.0 1.66 
1.51 1 75.0 1.51 
1.65 1.25 75.0 1.84 
1.64 1.09 75.0 1.71 
IV'eelrg DEJoy A> s aJI IV'eeIrg DEJoy A>s aJI 
(0 (0 (0 
Figure 6.2.1.1-E lA.O (BUR = 0.25) Effectiveness . 
Relatively small, but positive, effectiveness values are seen. 
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Ch,s Eh,s 
13.35 5.6 
10.33 7.2 
10.23 7.3 
9.87 7.6 
10.19 7.3 
10.63 7.0 
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The statistics of the data gathered by running the Simulator with a BUR of 0.20 (an update 
every 5.0 seconds) is shown in Table 6.2.1.1-F and Figure 6.2.1.1-F. 
Table 6.2.1.1-F L5.0 (BUR = 0.20) Effectiveness. 
L5.0 II! I I cr I Savings Rh,s Ch,B Eh,B 
Meeting 2.23 1.4 80.0 2.64 21.63 3 .6 
Delay 2.07 1.53 80.0 2.37 14.63 5.4 
Assault 1.99 1.42 80.0 2.79 14.64 5.4 
Meeting (e) 2.15 1.39 80.0 2.56 16.57 4.8 
Delay (e) 2.23 1.57 80.0 2.53 15.44 5.1 
Assault (e) 1.96 1.37 80.0 2.29 14.25 5.6 
E h.s 
rv'eefirg Delay As saJt rv'eefirg Delay AssaJt 
(C) (C) (C) 
Figure 6.2.1.1-F L5.0 (BUR = 0.20) Effectiveness. 
Small but positive effectiveness values are observed. 
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Accumulating the results of varying the BUR, we see: 
Eh,s 
.. 
" 
~ § § § 0 ~ '3 
+l Ql ~ .. 
" 
~ ~ Q • Q < 0 d '3 ::. +l Ql ~ ~ Q • ~ < ::. 
Scenarios 
Figure 6.2.1.1-G Comparison of varying the BUR. 
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.LO.S 
.Ll.S 
CL2.0 
CL3.0 
.L4.0 
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6.2.1.2. History heuristic 
The statistics for the history (His) heuristic in shown in Table 6.2.1.2-A and Figure 6.2.1.2-A. 
Table 6.2.1.2-A History effectiveness. 
Scenario 1111 lal Savings Rh,B Ch,B Eh,s 
Meeting 0.57 0.45 45 .6 0.382 3.13 14.6 
Delay 0.49 0.48 40.7 0.339 1.94 21.0 
Assault 0.55 0.49 46 .5 0.385 2.38 19.5 
Meeting (C) 0.66 0.48 47.1 0.457 2.99 15.8 
Delay (C) 0.57 0.44 44.8 0.378 2.09 21.4 
Assault (C) 0.52 0.53 47 .1 0.379 2.35 20.0 
Eh,s 
MBrg D3o,t AlsaJt MBrg D3o,t AlsaJt 
<Q <Q <Q 
Figure 6.2.1.2·A History effectiveness. 
A heuristic is "stable" if its range of Eh.s values from scenario to scenario is small. History is 
seen to be a stable heuristic. It is effective for all types of scenarios; combat or non-combat . 
The sta bility of the history heuristic is apparent by the uniformity of its Eh.s values. 
54 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6.2.1.3. Symmetry heuristic 
The statistics of the symmetry (Sym) heuristic are shown in Table 6.2.1.3·A and Figure 
6.2 .1.3·A. 
Scenario 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1.3·A Symmetry effectiveness. 
III I 
0.40 
0.36 
0.32 
0.40 
0.43 
0.33 
Eh,s 
I cr I Savings Rh,s 
0.28 46.7 0.212 
0.33 46.0 0.207 
0.41 46.2 0.205 
0.23 46 .6 0.192 
0.24 46.3 0.211 
0.37 46.3 0.201 
Marg Cl30y />6saJt Marg Cl30y />6saJt 
(Q (Q (Q 
Figure 6.2.1.3·A Symmetry effectiveness. 
Ch,s Eh,s 
1.74 26.8 
1.18 39.0 
1.27 36.4 
1.25 37.3 
1.17 39.6 
1.25 37.0 
As expected the results show symmetry to be very effective and stable. However, as 
previously mentioned, symmetry was only tested for entities simulated on the same network 
node. Applying symmetry across nodes would require network traffic to transmit the 
intervisibility determination results. That process was not tested . 
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6.2.1.4. Discrete sighter.based heuristic 
The statistics of the coarse·grain sighter·based (Sgt) heuristic is shown in Table 6.2.1.4-A and 
Figure 6.2 .1.4-A. 
Table 6.2.1.4·A Discrete sighter.based effectiveness. 
Scenario 1111 led Savings Rh,. Ch,. Eh,s 
Meeting 0.19 0.31 0.708 0.106 0.869 0.815 
Delay 0.28 0.30 -3.00 0.153 0.874 -3.43 
Assault 0.26 0.36 -0.631 0.156 0.963 -0.655 
Meeting (C) 0.25 0.29 20.7 0.135 0.882 23.5 
Delay (C) 0.26 0.33 27.9 0.149 0.823 33.9 
Assault (C) 0.26 0.31 19.1 0.145 0.901 21.2 
Eh,s 
M3e1rg DaO/ AssaJt M3e1rg 060/ AssaJt 
(C) (C) (C) 
Figure 6.2.1.4·A Discrete sighter-based effectiveness. 
The sighter-based heuristic performs better in combat situations than in non-combat 
situations. This is expected because this is where most of the sub-heuristics of the sighter-
based heuristic come into play and save intervisibility checks. For example, intervisibility 
determinations will be skipped by a sighter if it has been destroyed and such a situation can 
arise only in combat. 
For the non-combat delay and assault scenarios, the savings and Eh.s are negative; the 
heuristic costs more and saves less . In such a situation it may be better not to use the 
heuristic . 
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6.2.1.5. Discrete target-based heuristic 
The statistics of the coarse-grain target-based (Trg) heuristic is shown in Table 6.2.1.5-A and 
Figure 6.2.1.5-A. 
Table 6.2.1.5-A Discrete target-based effectiveness. 
Scenario 1111 I cr I Savings Rh,B Ch,s Eh,s 
Meeting 0.22 0.29 -0.380 0.118 0.967 -0.393 
Delay 0.36 0.34 1.09 0 .210 1.20 0.908 
Assault 0.24 0040 0.145 0.152 0.938 0.155 
Meeting (C) 0.36 0.33 17.9 0.207 1.35 13.3 
Delay (C) 0.39 0.38 39.8 0.240 1.33 29.9 
Assault (C) 0.34 0.29 6.87 0.183 1.14 6.03 
Eh,s 
rvtarg D30{ AisaJt rvtargCEiO{ AisaJt 
CO (0 CO 
Figure 6.2.1.5-A Discrete target-based effectiveness. 
Like the sighter-based heuristics, the target-based heuristic performs better in combat 
situations where its sub-heuristics are exercised. The sub-heuristics pertain to behaviors 
that are generally seen in combat situations. For example, intervisibility determinations to a 
target will be skipped if the target is destroyed and such a situation can arise only in combat. 
The heuristic is worse than no heuristic in the non-combat meeting scenario. 
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6.2.1.6. Continuous history heuristic 
The statistics of the fine-grain history (Fgh) heuristic are shown in Table 6.2.1.6-A and 
Figure 6 .2.1.6·B. 
Scenario 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1.6·A Continuous history effectiveness. 
1111 
0.46 
0.39 
0.44 
0.54 
0.40 
0.44 
Eh,s 
I cr I Savings Rh,s 
0.35 31.4 0.272 
0.30 25.4 0.214 
0.35 36.5 0.260 
0.41 36.8 0.346 
0.30 33.9 0.219 
0.36 38.8 0.264 
tvtarg ['GO{ P6saJt tvtarg ['GO{ P6saJt 
(0 (0 (0 
Figure 6.2.1.6·A Continuous history effectiveness. 
Ch,s Eh,s 
2.23 14.1 
1.22 20.8 
1.60 22.8 
2.26 16.3 
1.21 28.0 
1.64 23.7 
Fine-grain history performs quite well for all scenarios, a lthough its variability (maximum 
effectiveness - minimum effectiveness) is greater than the coarse·grain version's. 
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6.2.1.7. Continuous sighter-based h euristic 
The statistics of the fine-grain sighter-based heuristic is shown in Table 6.2.1.7 -A and Figure 
6.2 .1.7-A. 
Scenario 
Meeting 
Delay 
Assault 
Meeting (C) 
Delay (C) 
Assault (C) 
Table 6.2.1. 7-A Continuous sighter-based effectiveness_ 
1111 
0.39 
0.37 
0.35 
0.40 
0.37 
0.39 
Eh •• 
101 Savings Rh,s 
0.28 10.1 0.206 
0.29 5.63 0.199 
0.26 12.0 0.178 
0.26 29.0 0.204 
0.27 36.4 0.192 
0.27 27.7 0.203 
tv'eeIrg DaOf AssaJt M3elrg DelOf AssaJt 
(0 (0 (0 
Ch,8 
1.67 
1.14 
1.10 
1.33 
1.06 
1.26 
Figure 6.2.1. 7-A Continuous sighter-based effectiveness. 
Eh,s 
6.05 
4.94 
10.9 
21.8 
34.3 
22.0 
The Fine-grain, sighter-based heuristic performs much better than the coarse-grain version -
no negative Eh.s values were generated. The heuristic is more effective for combat scenarios 
than for the non-combat ones. This is because the sub-heuristics are exercised in combat 
situations leading to a saving in the number ofintervisibility determinations . 
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6.2.1.8. Continuous target·based heuristic 
The statistics of the fine-grain target-based heuristic is shown in Table 6.2.l.8-A and Figure 
6.2.l.8-A. 
Table 6.2.1.8·A Continuous target-based effectiveness. 
Scenario II! I I cr I Savings Rh,8 Ch,s Eh,s 
Meeting 0.38 0.28 8.33 0.201 l.65 5.05 
Delay 0.42 0.32 11.3 0.238 l.36 8.31 
Assault 0.38 0.28 9.57 0.201 l.24 7.72 
Meeting (C) 0.38 0.29 33.0 0.205 l.34 24.6 
Delay (C) 0.42 0.31 46.9 0.234 l.29 36.4 
Assault (C) 0.37 0.27 29.4 0.192 1.19 24.7 
E h,s 
tv'ee~rg DelO{ A>sa.Jt ~rg DelO{ A>sa.Jt 
(C) (C) (C) 
Figure 6.2.1.8·A Continuous targe t-based effectiveness. 
Fine-grain target results closely parallel those for the fine-grain, sighter heuristics. The 
heuristic is more effective for combat scenarios. Again, this is because combat scenarios 
exercise the sub-heuristics leading to a saving in the number of intervisibility 
determinations. 
60 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Accumulating the results for the discrete (coarse-grain) heuristics we see: 
Symmetry 
Heuristics 
History 
Sighter 
Target ~ 
C> 
" : 
::; 
Scenarios 
Figure 6.2.1.8-B Comparison of discrete (coarse-grain) heuris tics. 
6 1 
• Target 
.Slghter 
CHlstory 
CSymmetry 
--------------.............. ............. 
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Accumulating the result of the continuous (fine-grain) heuristics we see: 
Heuristics 
'" 
,.. 
'5 $I $I $I c ~ 
i 0; ~ 
'" 
,.. 
c on :; 
" 
on 
.: ~ .. 0; ~ ::;; ;; c on 
" 
on 
::;; .. 
Scenarios 
.Slghter 
• Target 
[] History 
Eb,s 
Figure 6_2.L8-C Comparison of continuous (fine-grain) heuristics. 
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6.2.2. Overall heuristic performance 
A heuristic's overall performance can be seen by comparing the range of its E h.s values across 
heuristics. A good heuristic should have high Ell,s values and its variability should be small. 
Heuristic A is said to be more stable than B if its effectiveness is less dependent on the 
scenario used for evaluation . 
Figure 6.2.2-A below shows the range of Eh" values for the implemented heuristics, and Eh" 
values for intervisibility BURs of 0.67 (a check every 1.5 seconds) and 0.5 (a check every 2 
seconds). This figure shows the history heuristic to be the most stable heuristic. Sighter and 
target-based heuristics have very large spreads, with the extreme left points showing 
negative efficiency. The fine-grain sighter and target-based heuristics are marginally more 
stable and effective then their coarse-gra in versions. The symmetry heuristic showed the 
greatest effectiveness with stability second to the history heuristic. 
sr", 
FGT 
FGH 
FGS 
SGT 
HIS 
u .s 
I u.o 
TRG 
-5 o 5 
Eh,s 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Figure 6.2.2-A Heuristic performance spread. 
Interestingly, all heuristics performed well in vigorous situations. This is indicated by the 
appearance of the combat scenarios predominantly on the right of each line and the non-
combat on the left. 
To determine the overall effectiveness Eh of a heuristic a weighted aver age is used . Since 
heuristics have more to offer in complicated scenarios (the combat scenarios), more weight is 
given to such scenarios than to non-combat scenarios. Combat scenarios are weighted 3 
times as much as non combat scenarios. 
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Eh can be computed as: 
where: 
Eh 
Eh.% 
s1 
s2 
s3 
s4 
s5 
s6 
Eh = (Eh"I+Eh" 2+Eh", )+3(Eh,,.+Eh.,s+Eh.,6) 
(Eh .,1 + Eh, , 2 + E.", + Eh, ,. + Eh",S + Eh. ,6) 
is the overall effectiveness heuristic h 
is the effectiveness of heuristic h for scenario x 
is the Meeting scenario 
is the Delay scenario 
is the Assault scenario 
is the Meeting (C) scenario 
is the Delay (C) scenario 
is the Assault (C) scenario 
Using this metric the heuristics are "ranked" as shown in Table 6.2.2-A. The table also shows 
the overall savings, Sh, and the overall cost, Ch, of the heuristics using the same weights as 
were used for establishing the ranking. The heuristics are listed in descending order of 
overall effectiveness, i.e ., from best to worst. 
Table 6.2.2-A Heuristic rankings_ 
Heuristic Eh Sh Ch 
Symmetry (Sym ) 37.0 46.4 1.3 
Fine-grain target (Fgt) 23.2 29.7 1.30 
Fine-grain history (Fgh ) 22 .0 35.1 1.7 
Fine-grain s ighter (Fgs) 21.3 25.5 1.2 
Sighter (Sgt) 19.4 16.7 0.9 
History (His) 18.9 45.8 2.5 
L1.5* 18.3 33.3 1.8 
L2 .0* 17.6 50.0 2.8 
Target (Trg) 12.4 16.2 1.2 
L3.0* 10.9 66.6 6.2 
L4.0* 7.2 75.0 10.5 
L5 .0* 5.1 80.0 15.8 
LO.5* 
-85.0 -100.0 1.2 
• Refer to Appendix A.1 for an explanation of these symbols . 
Data was gathered by running the Simulator with different BUD settings (50, 150, 200, 300, 
400, and 500) to see the effects of the IUR on the sightings. These experiments are referred 
to by "LX.x" in Table 6.2.2-A. Table 6.2.2-A shows that except for L1.5 and L2.0, the BUD-
based heuristics performed poorly and are at the bottom of the rankings. L1.5 and L2.0 seem 
to perform better than the target-based heuristic; but this is partly an illusion . 
The target-based heuristic (as well as all other heuristics) save "intelligently." Intervisibility 
determinations are delayed only when they are deemed acceptable, for example, when a 
scenario is calm. However, no delays are allowed when the scenario becomes more active, for 
example, when combat starts. In the combat scenarios vehicles may be destroyed quite early 
in the scenario leading to the ta rget-based heuristic delaying intervisibility determinations. 
In the non-combat versions intervisibility determinations may again be delayed due to the 
relative calmness of the scenario. 
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6.3. Evaluation comments 
Even the least effective heuristic studied (coarse-grain target) saves almost 40% of the 
intervisibility determinations for some scenarios; for example, Delay with Combat. It does 
this with high effectiveness. It can be argued that combat situations are where the heuristics 
are most needed because this is the most typical use of CGF systems. 
The sighter and target-based heuristics seem very reasonable; for example, destroyed 
vehicles should not be sighted or attempt to sight. The other components of these composite 
heuristics are similarly reasonable, but time did not permit experimental validation of each 
component individually. The components taken together performed well. 
Symmetry is shown to save on the order of 50% for all scenarios. This is a very intuitive 
result; because of the way symmetry works, one would expect it to eliminate half of the 
intervisibility determinations. The fact that this result was found in the experiment adds 
credibility to the experimental method used. Of course, the symmetry heuristic was tested 
only for entities that were generated by the same Simulator. Applying the symmetry 
heuristic across multiple Simulators, or in other words across multiple network nodes, would 
require network traffic to communicate the symmetry results. It is not at all clear whether 
the reduction in intervisibility processing produced by the symmetry heuristic is worth the 
additional network processing. 
It may be wondered what effect, if any, would be seen if the implemented heuristics were 
combined to give more complex heuristics. Symmetry by itself is very successful. It may be 
that entities that have firepower kills do not need to be sighted. Combining symmetry and 
not doing intervisibility determinations to entities that have firepower kills can lead to a 
substantial savings in the number of intervisibility checks. There are many other such 
combinations that should be investigated. This project did not examine the heuristics in 
combination because of time constraints. 
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7. Conclusions and future work 
7.1. Conclusions 
For this project, a number of intervisibility heuristics were designed, implemented, and 
experimentally evaluated within a CGF system. The overall goal of the heuristics was to 
reduce the overall computational expense of iotervisibility determioation in CGF systems 
without materially affectiog the realism of the autonomous behavior produced by those 
systems. Clearly, reduciog computational load is a worthy goal. An overloaded system may 
perform poorly io demanding conditions resulting in behavior degradation and loss of 
realism. 
The results show that the implemented intervisibility heuristics save substantial portions of 
the processing devoted to intervisibility checks, ranging from 10% to 50%. 
Moreover, these savings were achieved at little cost io terms of CGF behavior realism. The 
behavior generated by the CGF system would be expected to suffer if an iotervisibility 
heuristic significantly delayed the times at which hostile entities were sighted. That did not 
occur; the average sighting delay imposed by the various heuristics fell io the range of 0.3 to 
0.5 seconds. Such a delay is negligible, especially io light of the tremendous savings io 
processiog. 
Computer generated forces are becomiog iocreasingly complex as additional functionality is 
beiog added and more realistic behaviors are expected. It makes sense that some of the 
computational load be removed so that the CGF system can give more time to processiog 
additional functions . 
These results can be of great importance to CGF systems. By usiog one of these heuristics, 
the computational load of iotervisibility determination can be greatly reduced, thereby 
freeing computational capacity that can be applied to generatiog more sophisticated 
behavior, performing more realistic physical modeling, or simply controlling more entities on 
a given system. Because these heuristics are completely iodependent of the terrain database 
format, they can be applied to any CGF system. Therefore, one or more iotervisibility 
heuristics should be seriously considered for inclusion in any real-time CGF system. 
7.2. Future work 
Perhaps the biggest unanswered question, and, thereby, an opportunity for future work, is 
what might happen if the different heuristics were combioed? Put another way, what would 
the effectiveness and cost be of the heuristics used in various combioations? Time 
constraints did not permit the examioation of this issue io the project. Symmetry especially 
seems to be a likely candidate for combination with other heuristics, as its basic idea is very 
different from the other heuristics . 
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At Appendices 
A.I. Acronyms and glossary 
A H B 
Fine-grain 
FG 
Intervisibility 
IUR 
His 
Sym 
Sgt 
Trg 
Fgs 
Fgt 
Fgh 
meeting 
assault 
delay 
reference file 
input file 
LO.5 
L1.5 
L2.0 
L3.0 
L4.0 
L5 .0 
ARPA 
DARPA 
DIS 
SIMNET 
CDRL 
1ST 
CGF 
BMP 
Table A.I-A Acronyms and glossary used in this report .. 
The relation "A has a line of sight to B," (A HB implies B H A). 
Intervisibility heuristics that use a relatively rugh update rate to approximate 
continuous intervisibility delays are termed "Fine-Grain" in trus report. 
Fine-grain. 
Line Of Sight. 
The lntervisibility Update Ra te . Trus refers to the effective rate, as 
contrasted with the BUR. 
The rustory heuristic. 
The symmetry heuristic. 
Discrete version of the sighter-based heuristic. 
Discrete version of the target heuristic. 
Fine-grained version of the sighter-based heuristic. 
Fine-grained version of the target-based heuristic. 
Fine-grained version of the rustory heuristic. 
The meeting scenario. 
The assault scenario. 
The delay scenario. 
The data file to be used by the Statistical Analyzer as the base or reference. 
The data file to be used by the Statistical Analyzer whose sighting data is to 
be compared to s ightings in the reference file. 
No-heuristic run with BUD; 50 (BUR; 2, 2 checks/sec.) 
No-heuristic run with BUD; 150 (BUR; 0.67, 1 check every 1.5 seconds) 
No-heuristic run with BUD; 200 (BUR; 0.50, 1 check every 2.0 seconds) 
No-heuristic run with BUD; 300 (BUR; 0.33, 1 check every 3.0 seconds) 
No-heuris tic run with BUD; 400 (BUR; 0.25, 1 check every 4.0 seconds) 
No-heuristic run with BUD; 500 (BUR; 0.20, 1 check every 5.0 seconds) 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Distributed Interactive Simulation 
Simulation Network 
Contract Data Requirements List 
Institute for Simulation and Training 
Computer Generated Forces 
Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Russian infantry fighting verucle) 
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A.2. Statistical analyzer 
To analyze the data, a tool was implemented to match reference data (results from running 
the Simulator without a heuristic) with test data (results from running a Simulator with a 
heuristic). 
A.2.1. Data structures 
The LOS (Line Of Sight) program analyzes files containing binary LOS records (generated by 
the modified Simulators). The format of each LOS record is specified in h eader file "LOS.H" 
and uses structures defined in the header file "PRIMITIV.H." 
Each LOS record contains: 
• Sighter ID number and host number, 
• Sighter location x,y,z, 
• Target ID number and host number , 
Target location x,y,z, and 
• Time-of-sighting. 
The time-of-sighting is an integer tick count that is based on the PC's normal clock rate of 
approximately 18.2 ticks per second. 
The records in a LOS file should contain time values that are monotonically increasing. 
The LOS program maintains internal data structures that store time as a 'C' integer with a 
maximum value 32,767 ticks. It maintains internal data structures that assume the ID 
numbers range from 0 through 11. An error is printed if an ID exceeds this limit. The 
internal data structures store x,y,z as 'C' unsigned integers with maximum values of 65,535 
meters. 
A.2.2. LOS program runtime options 
The command to run the LOS program is : 
los [-Wn[ .mll [-N] [-Lj[.kll [-Dx] file_name1 [file_name2] 
where: 
file_name 1 
file_name2 
-Wn[.m] 
-N 
-Lj [.k] 
-Dx 
is a required binary file containing LOS_DATA records 
is an optional binary fi le containing LOS_DATA records 
sets an upper bound in seconds for the sighting window 
prevents test of an ID after it has caused a distance error 
sets an upper limit in seconds for times from the files 
sets an upper limit in meters for distances to allow a match 
If only one LOS fil e is specified, the file is printed and single·file analysis is performed . The-
w' -N, -L, and -D options are verified but are not used for this case . 
If two LOS files are specified, double-file analysis is performed. The -W, -N, -L, and -D 
options are verified and used. 
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A.2.3. Single-File analysis 
Each record in the LOS file is formatted and printed. The time in the LOS record is printed 
as seconds (tick count divided by 18.2, the ticks/second of the PC clock). 
Sighters are identified simply by an ID number. The sighter's host number is not printed. 
Targets are identified by an ID number that is qualified by a host number. The "ID,host" 
combination is denoted B,h. The LOS program prints events as (A-->B,h).n where A and B 
are ID numbers, h is the target host number, and n is the count of A-->B,h events in the file 
containing A-->B,h from the beginning through the current event. During the print, 
statistics are maintained for each sighter-->target, (A-->B,h), pair. For each A-->B,h pair 
found, the values printed are: 
• The time (in seconds) of the first A-->B,h sighting, 
• The total number of A-->B,h sightings, 
• The average time (in seconds) between successive A-->B,h sightings. 
The total number of LOS records is also printed. 
A.2.4. Doub le-F ile an alysis 
Double-file analysis requires two LOS data-file names to be specified when the LOS program 
is started. The first file named is used as the Reference-file, the second is the Test-file . 
Analysis proceeds record-by-record through the Reference-file until either the end of the 
Reference-file is reached or a time greater than that specified by the 'L' opt ion is reached . 
Each record indicates a sighting event and the time associated with the sighting. 
Sigh tel's are identified simply by an ID number. The sighter's host does not change within a 
file and is not printed. Targets are identified by an ID, qualified by a host number. The 
"ID,host" combination is denoted B,h. The LOS program prints events as (A-->B,h).n where 
A and B are ID numbers, h is the target host number, and n is the count of A-->B,h events in 
the file containing A-->B,h from the beginning through the current event. For each event not 
printed from the Reference-file: 
• The default time-window is first determined. The default time-window begins at 
the time of the previous A-->B,h event in the Reference-file, or at time 0 if there 
is no previous A-->B,h event. The default time-window ends with the time of the 
next A·->B,h event in the Reference-file, or at arbitrary time of 32,000, if there is 
no next A-->B,h event. 
• The default time-window may then be modified, if the -Wn[.m] parameter was 
specified. This parameter establishes an upper limit for the size of the time-
window around the A-->B,h event as follows: if -Wn[.m] was specified, the 
beginning window time may be increased to the time of Event A-->B,h minus 
n .m. The ending window time may be decreased to the time of Event A-->B,h 
plus n.m. If specified, -Wn[.m] can only pull the ends of the time-window toward 
the A-->B,h time and so can only make the current default time-window smaller. 
• All unprinted A-->B,h events in the Test-file that occurred before the desired 
time-window are printed . These Test-file A-->B,h events are identified as "extra", 
since no matching event is printed from the Reference-file . The "extra" Test-file 
events are marked internally as having been printed. 
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• The LOS program then attempts to find an A-->B,h event in the Test-file that is 
within the desired time-window surrounding the Reference-file A-->B,h event. If 
no A-->B,h event is found within the time-window, the Reference-file event is 
printed with an indication that the event was "missed" by the Test-file. 
If, however, an A-->B,h event is found within the window, the distance between sighter A in 
the Reference-file and sighter A in the Test-file, and the distance between Target B,h in the 
Reference-file and Target B,h in the Test-file, are computed. These distances are used to 
determine if the A-->B,h pair found in the Test-file is the same A-->B,h pair from the 
Reference-file. One of two prints: 
• If the sighter-to-sighter distance and the target-to-target distance are both 
smaller than the distance specified by -Dw, or if -Dw was not specified, the 
Reference-file (A-->B,h).n and the Test-file (A-->B,h).n events are printed, along 
with the event-time from each file and the difference in time between the 
sightings. This is considered to be a sighting compare. 
• If the -Dw parameter was specified, and if either the sighter-to-sighter distance 
or the target-to-target distance is greater than the distance specified by -Dw, the 
Reference-file (A-->B,h) .n and the Test-file (A-->B,h).n are printed along, with an 
error indicating that the events were "mismatched". The coordinates of the 
sighters and targets are printed. The Test-file event is marked internally as 
having been printed. 
In either case, the Test-file event is marked internally as having being printed. If the -N 
parameter was specified, and if the sighter-to-sighter distance is greater than that specified 
by -Dw, all of the sighter A events in both the Reference and Test fil es are marked as printed. 
This eliminates sighter A from any further testing. If the -N parameter was specified, and if 
the target-to-target distance is greater than that specified by -Dw, all of the Target B,h 
events in both the reference and test files are marked as printed. This eliminates Target B 
from any further testing. 
When all events from the Reference-file have been processed, the LOS program prints all 
events from the Test-file that were not previously printed. These are labeled as "extra" Test-
file records. 
Then, a count of the sightings compared (matched) is printed. For those sightings that 
compared, the mean and standard deviation of the signed time differences are printed. The 
mean and standard deviation of the absolute value of the time differences are also printed. 
Finally, counts are printed: 
• Reference-file sightings "missed" by the test-me, 
• "Extra" sightings that were only in the Test-me, and 
• Sightings where the events were mismatched (distance too great). This count is 
also expressed as a percentage of the sum of the compare count plus the 
mismatch count. 
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A.3. Skeleton for the fine-grain heuristics 
The fine-grain baseline (or skeleton) exists as a template for developing fine-b'Tain heuristics. 
It contains the watch-dog code, routines to allow statistics to be computed, and other 
elements common to all the fine-grain heuristics . 
This baseline produces checks at the same rate the user requested by u sing the trivial 
"heuristic" which requests a skip to be done every time (this is overridden by the watch-dog 
at the user requested frequency). 
The granularity is determined by a multiplier used in common by all the fine-grain 
heuristics. In brief, when an intervisibility message has been processed, a new intervisibility 
message is sent. The delay associated with this message is normally that specified by the 
user. For FG heuristics the delay is divided by the granularity multiplier, which is referred 
to as the RATE. A RATE of 3, for example, will not necessarily triple the message rate 
(which is the intent) for two reasons. Because more messages are being processed, delays 
may increase and, if RATE does not evenly divide the user requested delay, truncation will 
increase the rate. For example, if the user desires 20 messages a second, a value of 5 is given 
in the configuration file (it represents hundredths of seconds between deliveries). For the 
example at hand, the RATE used will not r esult in 60 messages a second but 100, because 5/3 
will be treated as 1. 
If the user requests N messages per second, and there are B local blue vehicles and R local 
red vehicles, the traffic produced will be N·B·R. Assuming no rounding, the RATE simply 
increases this to RATE-N·B·R. However, if the number of local vehicles is limited to 12 (as is 
the case for extant Simulator) B·R is bounded above at 36. The usual value ofN is no greater 
than 1. Thus, the number of messages produced by intervisibility requests (assuming no 
round off and message delays can be ignored) is no more than 36· RATE. 
It was decided only to consider RATEs which were powers of two: halving the interval 
between tests has a natural appeal. With that restriction, delays because of message flooding 
are not apparent, at least on the machines used for evaluation, until the RATE is 8 (36·8 = 
288 messages per second, but in the usual case the round off done when dividing 100 by 8 
yields a rate of 300 messages per second) . 
All the FG heuristics were based on RATE being 4 (4 messages per second when the user 
requests 1 update per second). Since the number of intervisibility messages generated has a 
factor of both RATE and the user requested rate, it should be apparent that if the user 
doubles the requested RATE message traffic may begin to impact the simul ation. 
It should be understood that to prevent actually increasing the number of intervisibility 
updates done , the number of consecutive skips is never allowed to drop below RATE - 1. 
Hence, a minimum of 3 skips were done for every intervisibility determination done . 
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A.4. Message delay in fine-grain heuristics 
When the fine-grain heuristics were designed, it was recognized they would generate 
additional overhead outside of the heuristics code. For example, the Simulator executive 
would have to handle more traffic to deliver the extra messages involved in stepping 
intervisibility through finer time intervals. To account for this, the heuristic measurements 
gather information about all levels of overhead involved in supporting their implementation. 
An unanticipated problem came about in connection with timer granularity. It took a 
considerable effort to fully understand the nature of this problem (as several red herrings 
were pursued), and no ideal solution was found to handling the problem. 
The major manifestation of the problem is in the failure of the FG skeleton (Section A.3) to 
carry out as many raw heuristic updates as the no-heuristic model. Since the skeleton 
generates N times the traffic, but skips N-l times, it should do the same number of updates 
regardless of the setting of N for 1 S N S M (where M is chosen such that the Simulator is not 
overwhelmed by the additional message traffic) . This did not turn out to be correct. 
Even with N = 2 under trivial system load, there was a significant drop in. the number of 
intervisibility determinations completed. It had been decided at the outset that the skeleton 
versions of the heuristics should perform approximately the same number of intervisibility 
determinations as the no-heuristic system. To illustrate how severe the problem is, here are 
the results for a trivial scenario and various values of N (Table A.4-A): 
Table A.4-A Rate vs. message d elivery performance. 
Heuristic Messages Expected Messages Received 
None 360 359 
Skeleton, RATE = 1 360 359 
Skeleton, RATE = 2 720 650 
Skeleton, RATE = 4 1440 1287 
Skeleton RATE = 8 2880 1656 
Lower values of N decrease the problem, but make the experiments less "fine-grained." In 
the remaining discussion an N of 4 is assumed. The authors decided 4 was the minimum 
value for the fine-grain experiments to live up to their name. 
Ail of these problems result from the clock granularity. The clock tics about 18.205 times per 
second, or about 0.054930 seconds between tics. On the other hand, the user is allowed to 
specify the timer interval in hundredths of seconds. Because of this, the user requests fall 
into equivalence classes. For example, a user-requested delay of I, 2, 3, 4, or 5 hundredths 
will aU be treated as requests of approximately 5.493 hundredths of a second. Equivalent 
delays lead to the same (within experimental error) number of messages being generated. 
The equivalence class notation was experimentally verified by running a simple scenario (2 
vehicles, no movement or firing) for 30 seconds. For this scenario, a BUD setting of 100 (1 
check per second) should yield exactly 60 messages, if their is no overhead for delivery or 
computing intervisibility. 
Table A.4-B shows the user requested BUD settings, the equivalence class into which the 
time should fall, the number of messages the user expects to see delivered with the requested 
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rate, and the number of messages actually delivered. For the equivalence class, both the 
time (a multiple of 0.054930) and the expected message delivery count for tha t delay time a re 
given. Note that, as one moves down the rows, the actual delivery approaches the 
equivalence class delivery. Because of overhead and rounding, the actual rates never reach 
the "expected" rate. 
Table A.4-B Timer equiva lence classes_ 
Requested Equivalence MsgsUser Actual # of 
Delay Class Expects Messages 
0 0 Infinite 26497 
1 5.4930/1092 6000 929 
2 " 3000 931 
3 " 2000 93 1 
4 " 1500 932 
5 " 1200 931 
6 10.986/546 1000 481 
7 " 857 ----
8 " 750 ----
9 " 667 ---.-
10 " 600 473 
11' 16.479 545 471 
12 " 500 319 
13 " 462 - ---
14 " 429 - ---
15 " 400 ----
16 " 375 319 
17 21.9721273 352 247 
18 " 333 -.--.-
19 " 316 ----
20 " 300 ----
21 " 286 2·11 
22' 27.465/218 273 2·11 
23 " 261 193 
24 " 250 ----
25 " 240 193 
26 " 231 ---. 
27 " 222 193 
28 32.9581182 214 169 
29 " 207 ----
30 " 200 Hi9 
, These boundary cells yield results in the next equivalence class because the time spent in 
dispatching and computing intervisibility makes the rates a multiple of (5.4930 + e) rather 
than just 5.4930. Notice that all of the cases marked are on the nominal class edges. 
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A.5. Rate analysis for fine-grain heuristics 
To generate the fine-grain heuristics accelerated message rates are required. However, a 
consequence of more traffic is increased overhead. This appendix examines the additional 
overhead and discusses the rational used in selecting a rate. 
These tables were generated by running a reasonably complicated test scenario. In all cases 
the 486166 PC used was reduced to a 486 compatible speed (approximately 25 MHz). This 
was necessary to gather reasonable statistics about the run, (since clocks sampling at higher 
speeds are too granular to catch the code in intervisibility checks). In this table: 
RATE is the multiplier applied to the user's requested intervisibility rate. A value of 5 
indicates the system will generate 5 intervisibility updates for everyone expected 
by the user. However, when no heuristic is in place (but rather only the heuristic 
skeleton, see Section A.3 ) 4 of the 5 requests will be treated as "skips" (i.e., these 
will not generate a "real" intervisibility update) . 
MSGS is the number of intervisibility update messages generated during the test. If 
there were no overhead this figure would be proportional to RATE since the same 
scenario was used for all the tests. 
RAW is the number of actual intervisibility determinations done. Since the FG 
heuristic skeleton was in use this figure would be constant but for system 
overhead. 
TIME is the amount of time (expressed as a percentage) spent in intervisibility updates. 
This figure includes all levels of intervisibility processing. 
EXEC indicates the percentage of intervisibility time spent at the executive's level. This 
time reflects dequeuing and delivering intervisibility update messages. 
COMP indicates the percentage of intervisibility time spent in computing whether an 
intervisibility determination should be done. Because the skeleton heuristic is in 
use this time is as small as possible. Real FG Heuristics may spend significant 
time determining whether an intervisibility determination is called for. 
RAW lists the time, as a percentage, spent doing actual intervisibility determinations . 
EXEC + COMP + RAW yields 100%. 
USER indicates the number of intervisibility determinations requested by the user 
deduced by taking the number of computation calls made (this figure is not 
shown in the table) and dividing by the RATE. If there were no overhead to FG 
this figure would be constant. 
Two sets of data are shown. The first represents data collection with a user requested rate of 
4 updates per second (per vehicle). The other shows the data corresponding to a user request 
of 3 118 updates per second. Certain key arithmetic regarding message delay involves 
rounding in one case, but is exact in the other. The two experiments were done to help 
understand the effects of rounding in these computations. 
The first data row (with RATE marked N/A) shows the result when no heuristic is used. No 
skipping, or code to support skipping, was in place. The changes from this line to the next 
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(RATE equal one) gives an indication of the overhead needed to put any FG heuristic in 
place, regardless of the heuristic's innate speed. 
Table A.5-A LOS Requested (4 updates/second) _ 
Rate Msgs Raw Time Exec Comp Raw User 
N/A 1048 6092 56.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 6092 
1 1015 5892 54.6 5.4 0.6 94.1 5892 
2 1492 4383 43.3 11.2 0.8 88.1 4363 
4 2136 3162 36.5 19.1 2.0 79.0 3135 
8 3026 2277 32.9 34.2 3.3 62.5 2277 
16 3961 1506 28.0 49.0 6.4 44.6 1456 
Table A.5-B LOS Requested (3 1/8 updates/second). 
Rate Msgs Raw Time Exec Comp Raw User 
N/A 988 5733 53.1 5.4 0.6 94.0 5733 
1 963 5583 52.5 5.7 1.0 93.3 5583 
2 1412 4140 40.9 13.0 1.6 85.4 4122 
4 1965 2924 35.5 17.9 1.8 80.4 2896 
8 2438 1830 27.2 33.0 4.5 62.5 1800 
16 3670 1386 25.9 44.6 3.7 51.7 1354 
Based on these results rounding does not appear to be an important factor for the purpose of 
these experiments. 
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A.S. nt-conditioned problem 
When small perturbations in a system cause large changes in the system's performance the 
system is said to be ill conditioned . For the purposes of this paper, the system under 
consideration is the 1ST CGF Simulator in combination with the utilities used to analyze its 
performance. The small perturbations to this system, which demonstrated its ill conditioned 
nature, included small changes in message delivery times, due to clock granularity and 
network traffic delivery times. 
Divergence can lead to vehicles following slightly different routes (because message delivery 
affects when a turn is executed), and the cumulative effects on the route changes ultimately 
has severe ramifications on sighting events . 
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A.7. Script files for the scenarios 
The format of the script commands is somewhat cryptic. Briefly, a command consists of 4 
parts. First, a delay, in seconds, before processing the command (this allows a gap between 
the execution of one command and the next). Second, a character or integer identifies the 
recipient of the command. Characters indicate simulation managers (for example, 'd' is the 
"display manager"). Integers identify a simulated entity and is the vehicle number (a 
component of its SIMNET vehicle ID). The first created will have a vehicle number of o. 
Third, a s ingle character gives the command. Fourth is a set of parameters to the command. 
For example: 
o d 0180100 
With no (0) delay, the display manager is to move the display to the coordinates (180,100). 
1 i c ml 100 150 
After a one second wait, the initialization manager is to create an Ml vehicle at the 
coordinates 000,150). 
Lines in a script that begin with an asterisk (*) are simply printed on the screen. If a line 
contains leading white space, it is ignored . These lines are used for comments. 
This section gives listings for the various test scenarios used for the syst em evaluation. 
Table A. 7 -A sh ows the script fil es that were used to implement the various scenarios. 
Table A. 7 -A Scenario breakup into script files. 
Scenario Movement-only Combat 
Blue Red Blue Red 
Meeting m_blu .tst mJed.tst mc_blu.tst cJ ed.tst 
Delay d_blu.tst dJed .tst dc_blu .tst dc_red.tst 
Assault a blu.tst a r ed.tst ac blu .tst ac red .tst 
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A.7.1. Script files for the meeting engagement scenario 
These are non-combat scenarios. "RED" scripts handle the red forces which play the role of 
the master in the simulations. "BLU" scripts control the blue forces and play the role of the 
slave simulator. 
* S1 awaits m1 
1 kw me 1 
* 
* Creation of first platoon: 4 X M2 
* (right echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 40080 42591 
o i c m2 *0 
Odm571 
o i cm2 * 1 
Odm071 
o i c m2 * 2 
o d m -10 80 
o i c m2 *3 
* 
* Creation of second platoon: 
* 2XM1. 1XM109.1XM977 
* (Wedge) 
* 
o d 0 40455 42631 
o i c m1 * 4 
o d m 72 75 
o i c m978 * 5 
Od m 78 
o i c m978 * 6 
o d m 71-73 
o i c m1 *7 
* 
* Creation of third platoon: 4 X M2 
* (left echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 41021 42550 
o i c m2 * 8 
Odm-7070 
o i c m2 *9 
o d m -70 70 
o i c m2 *10 
o d m -70 70 
o i c m2 *11 
* 
* Set facing 
* 
00 f 180 
01 f 180 
79 
02 f180 
03 f 180 
04 f 180 
05 fl80 
06 f 180 
07 fl80 
08 f180 
09 fl80 
010 fl80 
011 f 180 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the first 
* platoon 
* 
1 0 pw 40135 41929 a 
00 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 0 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 0 pw 40032 40419 a 
1 1 pw 40135 41929 a 
o 1 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 1 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 1 pw 40096 40491 a 
12 pw 40135 41929 a 
02 pw 40100 41446 a 
02 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 2 pw 40112 40571 a 
1 3 pw 40135 41929 a 
03 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 3 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 3 pw 40192 40605 a 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the second 
* platoon 
* 
1 4 pw 40375 41612 a 
04 pw 40566 41005 a 
o 4 pw 40494 40500 a 
o 4 pw 40495 40332 a 
1 5 pw 40445 41682 a 
05 pw 40636 41075 a 
o 5 pw 40564 40570 a 
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o 5 pw 40550 40402 a 
1 6 pw 40515 41682 a 
06 pw 40706 41075 a 
06 pw 40643 40570 a 
o 6 pw 40645 40422 a 
1 7 pw 40585 41612 a 
o 7 pw 40776 41005 a 
o 7 pw 40713 40500 a 
o 7 pw 40745 40332 a 
• 
* Specify waypoints for the third 
* platoon 
* 
1 8 pw 41464 42284 a 
08 pw 41186 41242 a 
o 8 pw 40902 40649 a 
1 9 pw 41394 42354 a 
09 pw 41116 41312 a 
09 pw 40832 40719 a 
1 10 pw 41324 42424 a 
o 10 pw 41046 41382 a 
o 10 pw 40762 40789 a 
1 11 pw 41254 42494 a 
o 11 pw 40976 41452 a 
* 
* move sim to desired location and 
* set scale 
* 
o d 0 40212 39505 
Ods8 
30, 
217 29 k e me 1 
2, 
* 
• instantiation of red platoon 1 
• 
o i c bmp2 39080 37540 0 
o i c bmp2 39010 37619 0 
o i c bmp2 38940 37680 0 
o i c bmp2 3887037759 0 
• 
* instantiation of red platoon 2 
* 
o i c t72 40212 37495 0 
80 
o 11 pw 40692 40859 a 
• 
• Slew display 
• 
1 d m -400 -1700 
Ods7 
• 
• Tell platoons to move 
* 
10 gw 
41 gw 
32gw 
23gw 
2 4gw 
27 gw 
45gw 
26gw 
28gw 
29gw 
210 gw 
211 gw 
16ar 
86an 
* 
••• end of script file 
• 
o i c URAL375F 40282374350 
o i c URAL375F 40352 37430 0 
o i c t72 40424 37495 0 
• 
* instantiation of red platoon 3 
* 
o i c bmp2 41169 37589 0 
o i c bmp2 41099 37510 0 
o i c bmp2 41019374490 
o i c bmp2 40949 37370 0 
* 
• waypoints for the key vehicle (0) 
* in red platoon 1 
* 
o 0 pw 39440 38273 
o 0 pw 39834 38951 
o 0 pw 40023 39692 
00 pw 40132 40100 
• 
* waypoints for the vehicle (1) in 
* red platoon 1 
I 
I 
• o 7 pw 40346 38336 
I o 1 pw 39374 38349 o 7 pw 40445 38634 o 1 pw 39764 39021 o 7 pw 40441 39355 o 1 pw 39979 39805 o 7 pw 40333 39746 
o 1 pw 40062 40170 o 7 pw 40515 39976 
I • • • waypoints for the vehicle (2) in • waypoints of KEY vehicle (8) in 
• red platoon 1 • red platoon 3 
• • I o 2 pw 39306 38413 08 pw 41161 38317 o 2 pw 39694 39091 08 pw 41191 38604 
I 
o 2 pw 39793 39663 o 8 pw 40809 39213 
o 2 pw 39883 39832 08 pw 40617 39347 
o 2 pw 39992 40240 o 8 pw 41158 39685 
• 08 pw 412lO 40325 
I • waypoints for the vehicle (3) in • • red platoon 1 • waypoints of vehicle (9) in red 
• * platoon 3 
03 pw 39201 38387 * I o 3 pw 39234 38487 09 pw 41110 38251 03 pw 39624 39161 o 9 pw 41154 38545 
03 pw 39813 39902 o 9 pw 4073939143 
I o 3 pw 39922 403lO 09 pw 40557 39270 • o 9 pw 41088 39615 
* waypoints of KEY vehicle (4) in 09 pw 41140 40255 
I * red platoon 2 * • • waypoints of vehicle (10) in red o 4 pw 40164 38433 • platoon 3 
04 pw 40198 38700 • 
I 04 pw 40231 39215 o 10 pw 4lO44 38170 o 4 pw 40207 39362 o 10 pw 40779 38383 
o 4 pw 40123 39536 o lO pw 40669 39073 
I o 4 pw 40359 40056 o lO pw 40487 39200 * o lO pw 40593 39406 
• waypoints of vehicle (5) in red o lO pw 4lO18 39545 
I • platoon 2 o 10 pw 4lO70 40185 * • o 5 pw 40234 38503 • waypoints of vehicle (ll) in red 
o 5 pw 40301 39285 * platoon 3 
I o 5 pw 40193 39606 * o 5 pw 40354 39926 o 11 pw 40977 38075 
• o II pw 40735 38280 
I • waypoints of vehicle (6) in red o 11 pw 40599 39003 • platoon 2 o 11 pw 40417 39130 
• o 11 pw 40523 39336 
I 
o 6 pw 40304 38503 o II pw 40948 39475 
o 6 pw 40448 38627 011 pw 41000 40115 
06 pw 40371 39285 • 
o 6 pw 40263 39676 • give red platoon 3 the command 
I o 6 pw 40446 39911 * to move out • * 
• waypoints of vehicle (7) in red 18 gw 
I • platoon 2 19 gw * llO gw 
I 81 
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III gw 
• 
• give red pla toon 1 the command 
* to move out 
• 
102gw 
23 gw 
11 gw 
20gw 
• 
• give red pla toon 2 the command 
• to move out 
82 
* 
25 4 gw 
15gw 
16 gw 
17 gw 
306, 
5 1729kx 
1, 
1 exit 
• 
.** end of script file 
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A.7.2. Script files for the meeting engagement scen ario w it h combat 
* SI awaits ml 
1 kw mec 1 
* 
* Creation of first platoon: 4 X M2 
* (right echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 40080 42591 
o i c m2 *0 
Odm571 
o i c m2 * 1 
Odm071 
o i c m2 *2 
Odm-1080 
o i c m2 * 3 
* 
* Creation of second platoon: 2 X 
* Ml, 1 X MI09, 1 X M977 
• (Wedge) 
* 
o d 0 40455 42631 
o i c ml * 4 
o d m 72 75 
o i c m978 *5 
Odm 78 
o i c m978 *6 
Odm71-73 
o i c ml 
• 7 
• 
• Creation of third platoon: 4 X M2 
• (left echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 41021 42550 
o i c m2 *8 
Odm-7070 
o i c m2 *9 
o d m -70 70 
o i c m2 * 10 
o d m -70 70 
o i c m2 * 11 
* 
* Permission to fire 
* 
10 (4000 
01 ( 4000 
02 ( 4000 
03(4000 
o 4 ( 4000 
05 (4000 
83 
06 (4000 
07(4000 
08(4000 
09(4000 
010 (4000 
011 (4000 
* 
* Set facing 
* 
00 f 180 
01 f 180 
02 f 180 
03 f 180 
04 f180 
05 f 180 
06 f180 
o 7f180 
08 fl80 
09 f 180 
010 fl80 
011 f 180 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the first 
* platoon 
* 
1 0 pw 40135 41929 a 
o 0 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 0 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 0 pw 40032 40419 a 
11 pw 40135 41929 a 
o 1 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 1 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 1 pw 40096 40491 a 
1 2 pw 40135 41929 a 
02 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 2 pw 39984 40935 a 
02 pw 40112 40571 a 
13 pw 40135 41929 a 
03 pw 40100 41446 a 
o 3 pw 39984 40935 a 
o 3 pw 40192 40605 a 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the second 
* platoon 
• 
14 pw 40375 41612 a 
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o 4 pw 40566 41005 a 
o 4 pw 40494 40500 a 
o 4 pw 40495 40332 a 
1 5 pw 40445 41682 a 
05 pw 40636 41075 a 
o 5 pw 40564 40570 a 
o 5 pw 40550 40402 a 
1 6 pw 40515 41682 a 
06 pw 40706 41075 a 
06 pw 40643 40570 a 
o 6 pw 40645 40422 a 
1 7 pw 40585 41612 a 
o 7 pw 40776 41005 a 
o 7 pw 40713 40500 a 
07 pw 40745 40332 a 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the third 
* platoon 
• 
1 8 pw 41464 42284 a 
08 pw 41186 41242 a 
o 8 pw 40902 40649 a 
1 9 pw 41394 42354 a 
09 pw 41116 41312 a 
o 9 pw 40832 40719 a 
1 10 pw 41324 42424 a 
o 10 pw 41046 41382 a 
o 10 pw 40762 40789 a 
• 
• move display to desired location 
* and set scale 
* 
o d 0 40212 39505 
Ods8 
30. 
2 17 29 k e mec 1 
2 . 
* 
* instantiation of red platoon 1 
* 
o i c bmp2 39080 37540 0 
o i c bmp2 39010 37619 0 
o i c bmp2 38940 37680 0 
o i c bmp2 38870 37759 0 
84 
1 11 pw 41254 42494 a 
o 11 pw 40976 41452 a 
o 11 pw 40692 40859 a 
* 
* Slew display 
• 
1 d m -400 -1700 
Ods7 
* 
* Tell platoons to move 
* 
10 gw 
41 gw 
32gw 
23gw 
24gw 
27 gw 
45gw 
26gw 
28gw 
29gw 
210 gw 
2 11 gw 
16 ar 
86an 
* 
*** end of script 
• 
* 
* instantiation of red platoon 2 
* 
o i c t72 40212 37495 0 
o i c URAL375F 40282 37435 0 
o i c URAL375F 40352 37430 0 
o i c t72 40424 37495 0 
* 
* instantiation of red platoon 3 
* 
o i c bmp2 41169 37589 0 
o i c bmp2 41099 37510 0 
o i c bmp2 41019 37449 0 
o i c bmp2 40949 37370 0 
00(4000 
o 1 ( 4000 
I 
I 02(4000 * 
I 
03(4000 • waypoints of vehicle (5) in red 
04 (4000 * platoon 2 
05(4000 • 
06(4000 o 5 pw 40234 38503 
I 07(4000 o 5 pw 40301 39285 08 (4000 o 5 pw 40193 39606 
09(4000 o 5 pw 40354 39926 
I 010 (4000 • 011 (4000 • waypoints of vehicle (6) in red • * platoon 2 
• waypoints for the key vehicle (0) • 
I • in red platoon 1 o 6 pw 40304 38503 • o 6 pw 40448 38627 
o 0 pw 39440 38273 o 6 pw 40371 39285 
I o 0 pw 39834 38951 o 6 pw 40263 39676 o 0 pw 40023 39692 06 pw 40446 39911 
00 pw 40132 40100 • 
• • waypoints of vehicle (7) in r ed I • waypoints for the vehicle (1) in * platoon 2 
• red platoon 1 * 
• o 7 pw 40346 38336 
I o 1 pw 3937438349 o 7 pw 40445 38634 o 1 pw 39764 39021 o 7 pw 40441 39355 
o 1 pw 39979 39805 o 7 pw 40333 39746 
I o 1 pw 40062 40170 o 7 pw 40515 39976 • * 
• waypoints for the vehicle (2) in • waypoints of KEY vehicle (8) in 
I 
* red platoon 1 • red platoon 3 
• * 
02 pw 3930638413 08 pw 41161 38317 
o 2 pw 39694 39091 o 8 pw 41191 38604 
I o 2 pw 39793 39663 o 8 pw 40809 39213 o 2 pw 39883 39832 08 pw 40617 39347 
o 2 pw 39992 40240 o 8 pw 41158 39685 
* 08 pw 41210 40325 I * waypoints for the vehicle (3) in * 
• red platoon 1 * waypoints of vehicle (9) in red 
• * platoon 3 
I 03 pw 39201 38387 * o 3 pw 39234 38487 o 9 pw 41110 38251 
o 3 pw 39624 39161 o 9 pw 41154 38545 
I o 3 pw 39813 39902 09 pw 40739 39143 03 pw 39922 40310 09 pw 40557 39270 
* 09 pw 41088 39615 
I 
* waypoints of KEY vehicle (4) in 09 pw 41140 40255 
* red pl atoon 2 * 
• * waypoints of vehicle (10) in red 
04 pw 40164 38433 * platoon 3 
I 04 pw 40198 38700 * 04 pw 40231 39215 o 10 pw 41044 38170 
o 4 pw 40207 39362 o 10 pw 40779 38383 
I o 4 pw 40123 39536 o 10 pw 40669 39073 o 4 pw 40359 40056 o 10 pw 40487 39200 
I 85 
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o 10 pw 40593 39406 
o 10 pw 41018 39545 
o 10 pw 41070 40185 
* 
* waypoints of vehicle (11) in red 
* platoon 3 
* 
o 11 pw 40977 38075 
o 11 pw 40735 38280 
o 11 pw 40599 39003 
o 11 pw 40417 39130 
o 11 pw 40523 39336 
011 pw 40948 39475 
o 11 pw 41000 40115 
* 
* give red platoon 3 the command 
* to move out 
* 
18 gw 
199w 
110gw 
III gw 
* 
86 
• give red platoon 1 the command 
* to move out 
• 
102gw 
2 3 gw 
11 gw 
20gw 
* 
• give red platoon 2 the command 
* to move out 
* 
25 4 gw 
15 gw 
16 gw 
17 gw 
306, 
51729 k x 
1, 
1 exit 
* 
**. end of script file 
* 
I 
I 
A. 7 .3. Script files for th e delay scenario 
I 
I 
• 5 2 pg 22826 22259 
• Display 33 pg 22936 22173 
• 
Ods8 1547 f290 
o d m 23365 22359 35 f290 
54 f290 
1 k w de 1 96 f290 
I 
• 81 awruts ml • 
• Start the attack 
• • 
I 
• Create platoon 1 94ad 
• 05ad 
o i c m2 23383 23885 06ad I 
00 f270 07ad 
o i c m2 23437 23936 
01 f270 00 f270 
o i c m2 23483 23981 01 f270 
I 
02 f270 
o i c m2 23531 24137 o 4 pg 20852 22553 
03 f270 6 7 pg 20705 22259 I 
• 4 5 pg 20889 22492 
• Create platoon 2 4 6 pg 20852 22369 
• I 
o i c ml 23879 23141 52 f270 
04 f270 • 
o i c m978 23949 23211 • move out bluel 
05 f270 • I 
o i c m978 24075 23117 7 0 pg 21513 22663 
06 f270 2 1 pg 21575 23006 
o i c ml 24014 22933 2 2 pg 21551 22859 I 
07 f270 33 pg 21514 22774 
• 
07 pg 22617 21315 
• Attack 
6 4 pg 22715 21487 • 
I 
65 pg 22740 21401 OOad 
6 6 pg 22699 21340 01ad 
02ad I 
36 0 pg 22740 22296 03ad 
I 6 1 pg 22740 22381 
I 
I 
I 
I 87 
I 
I 
D_RED.TST 
I • • 
• Set scale and init position • move BLUE platoon out 
• • 
I o d 0 22326 21805 11 6 pg 22568 20495 Ods9 2 7 pg 22630 20581 
28 pg 2263020519 
I 30. 2 9 pg 22679 20568 21729kedel • 2. • Second RED Movement 
• • I * create red platoon 1 45 0 pg 21667 23411 * 04 pg 21667 23306 
o i c t72 21025 24105 3 2 pg 21617 23356 
I o i c bmp2 20925 24105 13 pg 2161723331 o i c uraJ375[21000 24055 3 1 pg 21567 23411 
o i c uraJ375[ 20950 24055 o 5 pg 21567 23306 
o i c bmp2 21025 24000 • I o i c t72 20925 24000 * Third Red Movement 
* 
00[90 324 pg 2136122389 
I o If90 o 5 pg 21261 22494 02 f90 3 2 pg 21336 22444 
03 f90 03 pg 21286 22444 
I 04£90 o 1 pg 21261 22389 05 f90 20 pg 2136122494 
• 
I • create BLUE platoon 3 686 f300 • 57[300 o i c m2 23547 21693 
o i c m2 23664 21765 138 f300 
I o i c m2 23735 21837 59[300 o i c m2 23806 21904 
186 a d 
I 06 f270 07ad 07 f270 08ad 08[270 09ad 
09[270 • I • Final BLUE phase 06J2 • 
07 J 2 189 pg 21159 21573 
I 08 J 2 26 pg 2108621316 09 J 2 67 pg 2113521500 
• 28 pg 21110 21414 
• First RED Movement • I • • Final RED phase o 5 pg 20674 23288 • 
o 4 pg 20771 23288 31 1 pg 20008 22723 
I 3 3 pg 20705 23339 4 2 pg 20058 22803 1 2 pg 20760 23334 03 pg 20058 22753 
3 0 pg 20774 23383 4 4 pg 20108 22723 
I o 1 pg 20676 23389 
I 88 
I 
I 
32 5 pg 20008 22828 51729 k x 
I o 0 pg 20108 22828 140. 1. 1 erit "'end of script 
I 
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A.7.4. Script files for the delay scenario with combat 
• 
• Display 
• 
Ods8 
o d m 23365 22359 
1 k w dec 1 
• 81 awaits m1 
• 
• Create platoon 1 
• 
o i c m2 23383 23885 
00 f270 
o i c m2 23437 23936 
01 f270 
o i c m2 23483 23981 
02 f270 
o i c m2 23531 24137 
03 f270 
• 
* Create platoon 2 
* 
o i c m1 23879 23141 
04 f270 
o i c m978 23949 23211 
05 f270 
o i c m978 24075 23117 
06 f270 
o i c m1 24014 22933 
07 f270 
• 
* Give Permission to Fire 
* 
10 (4000 
01(4000 
02 (4000 
03 (4000 
04 (4000 
05 ( 4000 
06 ( 4000 
07 ( 4000 
07 pg 22617 21315 
• 
• set scale and init position 
90 
6 4 pg 22715 21487 
65 pg 22740 21401 
6 6 pg 22699 21340 
360 pg 2274022296 
61 pg 22740 22381 
5 2 pg 22826 22259 
3 3 pg 22936 22173 
1547 f290 
3 5 f290 
5 4 f290 
96 f290 
• 
• Attack 
• 
94ad 
05ad 
06ad 
07ad 
00 f270 
01 f270 
o 4 pg 20852 22553 
6 7 pg 20705 22259 
4 5 pg 20889 22492 
4 6 pg 20852 22369 
52£270 
• 
• move out blue 1 
* 
70 pg 2151322663 
2 1 pg 21575 23006 
22 pg 2155122859 
33 pg 21514 22774 
• 
* Attack 
* 
OOad 
01ad 
02ad 
03ad 
• 
o d 0 22326 21805 
I 
I Ods9 3 3 pg 20705 23339 
I 1 2 pg 20760 23334 30, 30 pg 20774 23383 2 17 29 k e dec 1 o 1 pg 20676 23389 
2, * 
I • * move BLUE platoon out • create red platoon 1 * 
• 11 6 pg 22568 20495 
I o i c t72 21025 24105 2 7 pg 22630 20581 o i c bmp2 20925 24105 2 8 pg 22630 20519 o i c ural375f21000 24055 2 9 pg 22679 20568 
o i c ural375f 20950 24055 * I o i c bmp2 21025 24000 * Second RED Movement o i c t72 20925 24000 * 
450 pg 21667 23411 
I 00 f90 o 4 pg 21667 23306 o lf90 3 2 pg 21617 23356 02 f90 13 pg 21617 23331 
I 
03 f90 3 1 pg 21567 23411 
04 f90 o 5 pg 21567 23306 
05 f90 * 
• * Third RED Movement 
I * create BLUE platoon 3 * • 32 4 pg 21361 22389 
o i c m2 23547 21693 05 pg 2126122494 
I o i c m2 23664 21765 3 2 pg 21336 22444 o i c m2 23735 21837 03 pg 21286 22444 o i c m2 23806 21904 o 1 pg 21261 22389 
I 
20 pg 2136 1 22494 
00 (4000 
01 (4000 686f300 
02 (4000 57f300 
I 03 (4000 04 (4000 138 f300 
05 (4000 59 f300 
I 06 (4000 07 (4000 186 a d 08( 4000 07ad 
09(4000 08ad 
I 09ad 06 f270 • 
07 f270 • Final BLUE phase 
I 08 f270 • 09 f270 189 pg 21159 21573 26 pg 21086 21316 
I 
06)2 6 7 pg 21135 21500 
07)2 28 pg 21110 21414 
08) 2 • 
09)2 * Final RED phase 
I * * • First RED Movement 31 1 pg 20008 22723 
• 4 2 pg 20058 22803 
I o 5 pg 20674 23288 03 pg 20058 22753 o 4 pg 20771 23288 4 4 pg 20108 22723 
I 91 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
32 5 pg 20008 22828 
o 0 pg 20108 22828 
140 . 
51729kx 
92 
1. 
exit 
• 
*** end of script file 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
A.7.5. Script files for the assault scenario 
* 
* SI wait 
* 
1 k was 1 
* 
* Creation of first platoon: 4 X M2 
* (right echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 6870 6573 
o i c m2 • 0 
o d m 70 72 
o i c m2 * 1 
o d m 70 70 
o i c m2 *2 
o d m 70 75 
o i c m2 *3 
* 
* Creation of second platoon: 
* 2XMl,IXM109,IXM977 
* (Wedge) 
* 
o d 0 7193 6853 
o i c ml * 4 
Odm70-72 
o i c M978 *5 
o d m 0 ·69 
o i c m978 * 6 
o d m ·70 ·70 
o i c ml * 7 
* 
* Specif'y waypoints for the first 
* platoon 
* 
1 0 pw 6027 6911 a 
o 0 pw 5404 6911 a 
00 pw 4797 6826 a 
o 0 pw 3726 6948 a 
o 0 pw 3505 7782 a 
00 pw 3179 9093 a 
1 1 pw 6077 6988 a 
o 1 pw 5454 6988 a 
o 1 pw 4867 6896 a 
01 pw 3790 7010 a 
o 1 pw 3575 7852 a 
o 1 pw 3249 9 163 a 
12 pw 6147 7021 a 
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02 pw 5504 7021 a 
o 2 pw 4937 6966 a 
o 2 pw 3850 7080 a 
o 2 pw 3645 7922 a 
02 pw 3319 9233 a 
13 pw 6217 7064 a 
o 3 pw 5554 7064 a 
o 3 pw 5007 7026 a 
o 3 pw 3930 7130 a 
03 pw 3715 7992 a 
o 3 pw 3389 9303 a 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the second 
* platoon 
* 
1 4 pw 5875 7377 a 
o 4 pw 5244 7872 a 
o 4 pw 5140 8149 a 
04 pw 4723 8799 a 
o 4 pw 3988 8897 a 
04 pw 3179 9093 a 
15 pw 5945 7317 a 
05 pw 5314 7802 a 
o 5 pw 5210 8079 a 
05 pw 4793 8729 a 
o 5 pw 4058 8827 a 
o 5 pw 3249 9023 a 
16 pw 5945 7247 a 
06 pw 5314 7732 a 
06 pw 5210 8009 a 
06 pw 4793 8659 a 
o 6 pw 4058 8757 a 
o 6 pw 3249 8953 a 
17 pw 5875 7177 a 
o 7 pw 5244 7662 a 
o 7 pw 5140 7939 a 
07 pw 4723 8589 a 
o 7 pw 3988 8687 a 
07 pw 3179 8883 a 
* 
* Slew display 
* 
1 d 0 6870 6593 
Ods4 
* 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
* Tell platoons to move 
* 
10gw 
11 gw 
12 gw 
13 gw 
84gw 
17 gw 
15 gw 
16gw 
02ar 
* 
* Red and blue platoon 3 Assault 
* scenario 
* 
Ods9 
o d 0 5238 8500 
* start the simulation 
30. 
21729keas 1 
2. 
* 
* Create red force 
* 
o i c bmp1 3765 9083 
o i c ural375f 34249162 
o i c bmp1 3647 8463 
o i c t72 3008 8921 
o i c ural375f 34079063 
o i c bmp1 3827 8334 
* 
* Create blue 3 
* 
o i c m2 7120 7010 
o i c m2 7060 6922 
o i c m2 6988 6851 
o i c m2 6918 6791 
* 
* waypoints for blue 6 (key) 
* 
06 pw 6221 8311 
o 6 pw 5238 8948 
06 pw 4772 9301 
06 pw 3814 9416 
06 pw 3212 9680 
* 
* waypoints for blue 7 
94 
82an 
13 a r 
53an 
* 
* Set speed 
* 
1743 ad 
82ad 
lOad 
01ad 
* 
*** end of script file 
* 
* 
o 7 pw 6161 8251 
o 7 pw 5168 8888 
07 pw 4702 9231 
o 7 pw 3764 9386 
07 pw 3142 9620 
* 
* waypoints for blue 8 
* 
08 pw 6091 8181 
08 pw 5098 8818 
08 pw 4632 9161 
08 pw 3714 9336 
o 8 pw 3072 9550 
* 
* waypoints for blue 9 
* 
09 pw 6021 8111 
09 pw 5028 8748 
09 pw 4562 9091 
o 9 pw 3664 9286 
o 9 pw 3002 9480 
* 
* set speed 
* 
06an 
07an 
08an 
09an 
* 
* Make red force face the blue 
* force 
* 
10 f90 
01 flOO 
02 f90 
03 f90 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
04 f90 
05 f 120 
• 
• have blue 3 move out 
• 
189 gw 
36gw 
28gw 
27 gw 
95 
519 , 
51729kx 
1 , 
1 exit 
• 
••• end of script file 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
A.7.6. Script files for the assault scen ario with combat 
* 
* SI wait 
* 
lkw ascl 
* 
* Creation of first platoon: 4 X M2 
* (right echelon after facing south) 
* 
o d 0 6870 6573 
o i c m2 * 0 
o d m 70 72 
o i c m2 * 1 
o d m 70 70 
o i c m2 *2 
o d m 70 75 
o i c m2 *3 
• 
• Creation of second platoon: 2 X 
* Ml, 1 X MI09, 1 X M977 
* (Wedge) 
* 
o d 0 7193 6853 
o i c ml • 4 
o d m 70 -72 
o i c M978 *5 
o d m 0 -69 
o i c m978 *6 
Odm-70-70 
o i c ml * 7 
* 
• Give Permission to fire 
• 
10 (4000 
01(4000 
02 (4000 
03(4000 
04(4000 
05 (4000 
06 ( 4000 
07 (4000 
• 
* Specify waypoints fo r the fi r st 
* platoon 
• 
1 0 pw 6027 6911 a 
o 0 pw 5404 6911 a 
00 pw 4797 6826 a 
o 0 pw 3726 6948 a 
96 
o 0 pw 3505 7782 a 
00 pw 3179 9093 a 
1 1 pw 6077 6988 a 
o 1 pw 5454 6988 a 
o 1 pw 4867 6896 a 
o 1 pw 3790 7010 a 
o 1 pw 3575 7852 a 
o 1 pw 3249 9163 a 
1 2 pw 61477021 a 
o 2 pw 5504 7021 a 
o 2 pw 4937 6966 a 
o 2 pw 3850 7080 a 
o 2 pw 3645 7922 a 
02 pw 3319 9233 a 
1 3 pw 6217 7064 a 
o 3 pw 5554 7064 a 
o 3 pw 5007 7026 a 
o 3 pw 3930 7130 a 
03 pw 3715 7992 a 
o 3 pw 3389 9303 a 
* 
* Specify waypoints for the secor.d • 
platoon 
* 
1 4 pw 5875 7377 a 
04 pw 5244 7872 a 
04 pw 5140 8149 a 
04 pw 4723 8799 a 
o 4 pw 3988 8897 a 
04 pw 3179 9093 a 
1 5 pw 5945 7317 a 
05 pw 5314 7802 a 
05 pw 5210 8079 a 
05 pw 4793 8729 a 
o 5 pw 4058 8827 a 
o 5 pw 3249 9023 a 
16 pw 5945 7247 a 
06 pw 5314 7732 a 
o 6 pw 5210 8009 a 
06 pw 4793 8659 a 
06 pw 4058 8757 a 
o 6 pw 3249 8953 a 
17 pw 5875 7177 a 
I 
I o 7 pw 5244 7662 a 17 gw 
I o 7 pw 5140 7939 a 15 gw 07 pw 4723 8589 a 16 gw o 7 pw 3988 8687 a 
07 pw 3179 8883 a 02ar 
I • 82an • Slew display 13ar 
• 53 an 
1 d 0 6870 6593 • I Ods4 • Set speed 
* • 
• Tell platoons to move 1743ad 
I • 82ad 10 gw lOad 
11 gw 01ad 
I 12 gw • 13 gw .*. end of script fil e 
• 
I 84gw AC_RED.TST 
I * 02 (4000 • Red and blue platoon 3 Assault 03(4000 
* scenario 04 (4000 
I • 05(4000 Ods9 06(4000 o d 0 5238 8500 07 (4000 
* 08 (4000 I * Start the simulation 09 (4000 * • 
30, • waypoints for blue 6 (key) 
I 21729 k e asc 1 • 2, 06 pw 6221 8311 
• o 6 pw 5238 8948 
I • Create red force 06 pw 47729301 • 06 pw 3814 9416 o i c bmp1 3765 9083 06 pw 3212 9680 
o i c ural375f 34249162 • 
I o i c bmp1 3647 8463 • waypoints for blue 7 o i c t72 3008 8921 • 
o i c ural375f 3407 9063 07 pw 6161 8251 
I o i c bmp1 3827 8334 07 pw 5168 8888 • 07 pw 4702 9231 
• create blue 3 o 7 pw 3764 9386 
• 07 pw 31429620 I o i c m2 7120 7010 • o i c m2 7060 6922 • waypoints for blue 8 
o i c m2 6988 6851 • 
I o i c m2 6918 6791 08 pw 6091 8181 o 8 pw 5098 8818 
00 (4000 08 pw 4632 9161 
I 01 (4000 08 pw 3714 9336 
I 97 
I 
I o 8 pw 3072 9550 
• 
I • waypoints for blue 9 • 
09 pw 6021 8111 
I 09 pw 5028 8748 09 pw 4562 9091 o 9 pw 3664 9286 
I 
o 9 pw 3002 9480 
• 
• set speed 
• 
I 06an 07an 
08an 
I 09an • 
• Make red force face the blue 
• force 
I • 10 f90 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 98 
01 f 100 
02 f90 
0 3 f90 
04 f90 
05 f120 
• 
• have blue 3 move out 
• 
18 9 gw 
36 gw 
28gw 
2 7 gw 
519. 
5 1729kx 
1 • 
1 exit 
• 
* •• end of script file 
* 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
A.S. The LOS journal 
The LOS journal was written by Sumeet Rajput and portrays the ideas and thoughts that 
went behind this project. At the end of every day, the author would try to remember the 
important events of the day and record his feelings about how the project was progressing. 
The journal reflects how problems were recognized and tackled . By its nature the journal is 
informal but nonetheless will help the reader understand some of the technical challenges 
that were overcome. 
Interested readers can contact Mikel D. Petty to request access to the journal. 
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